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Abstract 
 
The 2011 Arab Spring has created a serious migration and humanitarian crisis. 
Asylum seekers began attempting to reach Europe through various routes due to 
brutal conflict in their home countries. This influx has affected countries on the 
periphery of the European Union, including the Western Balkans. The Western 
Balkans route is the second-most traversed route from the Middle East and North 
Africa to the EU. The surge of migration into these so-called transit countries have 
left them grappling with questions of how to manage, process, and integrate refugee 
populations. This thesis looks at three case countries – Croatia, Serbia, and 
Macedonia – and seeks to explain why and what effects this influx of asylum seekers 
and, often, the unanticipated long-term stay of asylum seekers has on the political, 
economic, and social stability of the case countries.  
  
 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Contemporary Refugee Crisis 
 
With more than 65 million displaced people around the world in 2015, 1.3 
million asylum seekers have sought refuge globally in response to the present 
conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (hereafter MENA).1 This large-scale 
movement has resulted in the demand for transit routes from MENA into Europe, 
specifically into member states of the European Union (EU). Because the EU 
encompasses 28 states and represents a unified community, it has defined regulations 
for its community to deal with refugee identification, integration, and registration 
that individual states that have not yet acceded to the EU or those that act on an 
individual policy level apart from the EU do not have.2 Additionally, the EU as a 
multilateral organization maintains greater financial stability and more stable 
institutions that can be used to positively affect its response to the refugee crisis. For 
these reasons, it is evident that the EU has become a desired destination for those 
fleeing warzones.3 This phenomenon has created a humanitarian crisis in the 
                                                 
1 “Figures at a Glance,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, accessed 
25 August 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html.  
2 At the time of writing, the United Kingdom remains a member of the EU. 
However, the Brexit vote in the summer of 2016 triggered the beginning of the 
process to leave the EU, which will leave the EU at 27 member states. “United 
Kingdom Overview,” European Union, accessed December 2017. 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-
countries/unitedkingdom_en#brexit.  
3 While many of those transiting through the Western Balkans are legally considered 
asylum seekers, some are fleeing poverty. This population of migrants does not have 
the same legal protections as asylum seekers. This distinction is important in the 
ability for states to process migrants because it is difficult to account for the numbers 
in each category entering the country. “UNHCR Viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘migrant’ – 
Which is right?” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, accessed 
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Western Balkans, where asylum seekers are attempting to cross international borders 
into countries that continue to recover from authoritarianism and subsequent civil 
war.  
Media and other public sources have labeled this phenomenon the “refugee 
crisis,” as often the end goal for asylum seekers is to be granted refugee status in 
Europe. For these empirical reasons, I refer to the broad movement of people from 
MENA to Europe as the “refugee crisis”. However, I will use the term “asylum 
seekers” to refer to the individuals that enter transit countries before they are 
formally granted refugee status. Asylum seekers are defined here and in international 
law as persons “whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.”4 Asylum 
seekers seek refuge under the same conditions as refugees as outlined in international 
law under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Related to the Status of 
Refugees. A refugee is a person who has crossed an international boundary and seeks 
sanctuary based on a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”5 Additionally I will use 
the term “irregular migration” to refer to “the cross-border flow of people who enter 
                                                 
December 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-
viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html. 
4 “Asylum-Seekers,” United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, accessed 25 
October 2017. http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/asylum-seekers.html.  
5 “United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
 United Nations General Assembly, Article 1(A)(2). 
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a country without that country’s legal permission to do so.”6 This can encompass a 
wide range of migrations patterns and is, therefore, used as a broad term to include 
the phenomenon of asylum seeker and refugee movement. 
One of the transit routes into Europe from MENA, called the Western 
Balkans route, weaves in various combinations through former Yugoslav countries 
and Albania into Western Europe.7 Destination countries include such EU member 
states as Germany and Sweden. To process this large influx of asylum seekers, the 
states in the Western Balkans region have been pressured to create and amend 
policy, establish valuable infrastructure, and seek international guidance to make the 
process efficient and appropriate – that is, adhering to international norms as codified 
in international law.8 This pressure stems in part from the EU as all three case 
countries – Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia – have applied for EU membership and 
one – Croatia – was granted membership in 2013. Additionally, these countries aim 
to preserve stability in their territories, despite a large-scale influx of asylum seekers. 
Because of their recent history of violence, preserving stability is more difficult than 
in countries like Germany. The results of these initiatives vary from country to 
country and the influx of asylum seekers has impacted transit countries to varying 
degrees, revealing the state of post-conflict stability in former republics of 
                                                 
6 Bastian Vollmer, “Irregular Migration in the UK: Definitions, Pathways and 
Scales,” The Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, (2011): 2.  
7 I use Western Balkans to refer to Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Albania. Former Yugoslav states include 
Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and 
Slovenia. 
8 “Meeting on the Western Balkans Migration Route: Leaders agree on 17-point plan 
of action,” European Commission, press release from 25 October 2015.  
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Yugoslavia. In this project, I analyze the effects of irregular migration in the form of 
asylum seekers through the Western Balkans on stability in three countries: Croatia, 
Serbia, and Macedonia.9 I seek to answer the question: to what extent has irregular 
migration through the form of asylum seekers migrating from MENA affected the 
stability of the former Yugoslav states of Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia?  
The Western Balkans’ response to the refugee crisis and the effects irregular 
migration has on the countries themselves represents an interesting case because of 
the Western Balkan’s past experience with refugees. The Western Balkans region is 
not new to the phenomenon of refugee migration. A particularly large group of 
asylum seekers originating from the Western Balkans attempted to enter the 
European Union during the region’s lengthy period of instability following the fall of 
Yugoslavia. The following decades did not bring lasting peace, as countries in 
Yugoslavia declared independence and ethnic groups began to war over various 
Yugoslav territories.10 This project seeks to understand the shift the Western Balkans 
has experienced from creating a population of asylum seekers to managing a 
population of asylum seekers from other regions. Additional questions about a state’s 
ability to gain insight from past experiences were revealed when it has a protracted 
history as the population on the other side of the equation.   
                                                 
9 There is a current dispute regarding the official name of Macedonia. While the 
officially recognized name by international organizations pressured by Greece is the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Macedonia itself uses the name 
Republic of Macedonia. In this thesis, I will refer to the territory of the FYROM as 
simply Macedonia. Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Macedonia-Greece Name Dispute: 
What’s in a Name?” Balkan Insight, published 30 June 2011. 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/background-what-s-in-a-name.  
10 “Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia,” BBC, updated 22 May 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4997380.stm. 
 5 
Life and Death of Yugoslavia 
 
 Yugoslavia’s rise and downfall mobilized ethno-nationalist sentiments 
throughout the former Yugoslav territories and Albania that were previously 
suppressed by years of Tito’s Communism. The state “had always been the scene of 
sporadic outbursts of political persecution, political trials, and the imprisonment of 
political opponents.”11 The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was created in 1929 and 
transitioned to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the Second World 
War.12 The post-war Yugoslavia had extensive problems during its forty-year 
existence due to its reputation for political persecution. Its form of “democracy” after 
the fall of Communism in 1989 was transitional in nature, due to the length of time it 
takes for authoritarian states to achieve democratic consolidation. Its market 
economy and independent judiciary were unstable and did not function in the same 
capacity as those of a consolidated democracy.13 After steady attempts at reform, it 
was clear that Yugoslavia would face “insuperable obstacles”, including political 
developments in two opposite directions in different parts of the country – 
consolidation of the Communists in power in some parts of the country and the 
beginning of reforms in other parts – and the pervasiveness of nationalism on the 
side of those in power.14 Ultimately, in the face of a governmental turnover after the 
                                                 
11 Vesna Pusic, “A Country by Any Other Name: Transition and Stability in Croatia 
and Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Society 6, no. 3 (1992): 243. 
12 John B. Allcock, “Yugoslavia: Former Federated Nation,” Encyclopedia 
Britannica, updated 14 September 2017. 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Yugoslavia-former-federated-nation-1929-2003.  
13 Pusic, 244. 
14 Ibid, 248. 
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death of Tito, civil society was “too weak to impose their standards and stabilize the 
new regime.”15  
The rise of Serb nationalism triggered the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia in its present form was “no longer an adequate solution to the Serbian 
question.”16 Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic rose to power under the guise of 
continued Titoism before he progressed away from Titoist Communism to 
unrestricted, authoritarian nationalism.17 Milosevic’s reign prompted concerns about 
the territory of Kosovo and he subsequently seized power over Belgrade’s media 
outlets.18 Milosevic continued consolidating power by demanding Serbian 
centralization in Yugoslavia.19 In 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence 
and seceded from Yugoslavia, igniting conflict with Serbia. Bosnia and Macedonia 
subsequently declared independence and conflict erupted.  
This period saw a reemergence of nationalism in the states in the Western 
Balkans.20 The Dayton Peace Agreement was drafted in 1995 to secure peace 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with 
pressure from the United States and the broader international community. A NATO-
led peace-keeping force was deployed to oversee the enforcement of the Dayton 
Peace Agreement. Since the spring of 1999, stability in the Western Balkans has 
                                                 
15 Pusic, 255. 
16 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of Nation, (New York: Penguin 
Group, 1996): 32.  
17 Ibid, 33-34. 
18 Ibid, 47. 
19 Ibid, 73. 
20 “Timeline: Break-Up of Yugoslavia.” 
 7 
“remained fragile.”21 The formal successor state of Yugoslavia – Serbia and 
Montenegro – ceased to carry the name Yugoslavia and were jointly dubbed Serbia 
and Montenegro in 2000. Ethnic violence again escalated in Macedonia in 2001 with 
the Albanian minority in the country.22 Subsequent United Nations Security Council 
resolutions and NATO operations in the Western Balkans have aimed to combat this 
social instability and guide the region toward sustainable peace and security. 
Despite Slovenia’s accession to the EU in 2004, as of 2005, scholars posited 
that the countries in the region were moving toward increased instability and 
fragmentation, while the rest of Europe was moving toward increased integration.23 
In 2013 Croatia acceded to the EU, highlighting a more recent campaign for 
European enlargement by the Western Balkan and post-Yugoslav countries. 
However, EU enlargement has been affected by the current humanitarian crisis in the 
Western Balkans. 
Current EU-led reforms in the Western Balkans are attempts at bringing the 
Western Balkans “back into Europe’s fold” by bringing about greater cooperation 
and a more integrated Europe.24 These initiatives have become more evident in the 
current refugee crisis, as the EU and the Western Balkan states coordinate and 
attempt to establish a cohesive process for dealing with asylum seekers. Due to 
variance in states’ levels of “Europeanization” – the internalization of the norms of 
                                                 
21 Charles Wayne Van Bebber, “The U.S. Approach to Post-Conflict Stability in the 
Southern Balkans and its Consequences 1999-2001,” Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, (2009): ix. 
22 “Timeline: Break-up of Yugoslavia.” 
23 Othon Anastasakis, “The Europeanization of the Balkans.” Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 7, no. 1, (2005): 77. 
24 Ibid, 80. 
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the EU acquis communautaire –  there is extreme differentiation in the process of 
EU integration from country to country.25 Variables in these countries that differ 
drastically include levels of political performance, levels of economic performance 
and “diverse co-existing stages of association and integration with the EU.”26 Social 
tensions are also a concern, as the Western Balkans have a history of bloody ethnic 
conflict and high levels of ethno-nationalism and ethnic tension.  
Western Balkans Migration Route 
 
The primary Western Balkans route is represented below and weaves through 
Macedonia, Serbia, and Croatia into the EU.22 The Western Balkans route 
experienced a large influx of asylum seekers in 2011, primarily from Syria and Iraq, 
with many migrants still stemming from Afghanistan.27 The influx peaked in the 
region in 2015 with most asylum seekers attempting to reach the EU through these 
transit countries.28 The Western Balkans passageway through Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia, and Macedonia became especially popular when Schengen visa 
restrictions were relaxed for these countries and mobilization became more realistic. 
Initially, asylum seekers in this region sought asylum in Hungary after crossing the 
                                                 
25 Anastasakis, 86. 
26 Ibid, 86. 
22 Federica Mastroforti, “Migrant crisis, the Balkans defense of national borders,” 
Mediterranean Affairs, published 7 March 2016. 
http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/migrant-crisis-the-balkan-defense-of-national-
borders/. 
27 “Western Balkan Route,” Frontex, accessed August 2017, 
http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-balkan-route/. 
28 Ibid.  
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Hungarian border illegally up until the Hungarian government strengthened its 
border controls in 2013.29  
 
Figure 1: Map of the Western Balkans Migration Route from 
http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/migrant-crisis-the-balkan-defense-of-national-
borders/.  
Between 2013 and 2015, numbers of illegal border crossings increased from 
19,950 to 764,038 in the Western Balkans.30 In 2015 the Western Balkans route 
became the second most traversed route by refugees from the Middle East behind the 
Eastern Mediterranean route, which crosses the Mediterranean Sea into Greece.31 In 
a region marred by ethnic tension, recent bloody conflict, and political and financial 
instability, Western Balkan countries have struggled to various degrees to respond to 
the refugee crisis. At the start of the refugee crisis, Western Balkan countries agreed 
                                                 
29 “Western Balkan Route.” 
30 EWB Archives, “Balkan Migration Route: Ongoing Story,” European Western 
Balkans, accessed August 2017. 
https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/02/22/balkan-migration-route-ongoing-
story/.  
31 “Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts,” BBC News, 4 
March 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911.  
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to “facilitate the movement of asylum seekers through their territories.”32 However, 
as the crisis wore on, destination countries began to pressure transit states to close 
borders to prevent having to take permanent responsibility for refugees. “Pressure 
from EU Member States ultimately led to a domino effect of border closures and 
increasing restrictions on movement as the crisis wore on.”33 This domino effect 
describes the phenomenon of border closures in some states and the effects on 
neighboring states, including the flows of asylum seekers through the region. 
After a surge of refugees entered the EU through Hungary, the closure of 
Hungary’s border in 2015 diverted refugee flows through Croatia and Slovenia, 
straining capacities at borders and reception centers in Croatia, Serbia, and 
Macedonia, among those in other Western Balkan countries.34 The resulting 
humanitarian crisis has become an important item on the EU’s agenda, as officials 
strive for cooperation between EU governments and governments in the Western 
Balkans to orchestrate a coordinated transnational response to the refugee crisis. 
Croatia’s EU membership complicates this process because, as an EU member state, 
Croatia was “obliged to adopt EU-style asylum laws” but has also restricted 
movement to “avoid responsibility for trapped migrants.”35 According to Milica 
Mancic and Kristine Anderson in the Balkans Office of the International Rescue 
                                                 
32 Alice Greider, “Outsourcing Migration Management : The Role of the Western 
Balkans in the European Refugee Crisis,” Migration Policy Institute, 17 August 
2017. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/outsourcing-migration-management-
western-balkans-europes-refugee-crisis. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Raphaela Engel, “The impact of migration on the Western Balkans from an 
Austrian perspective,” Migration Panorama Second Edition (2016): 15.  
35 Greider. 
 11 
Committee, European officials have expressed contradictory messages to both transit 
countries and destination countries regarding the refugee crisis. There is a 
fundamental lack of implementation of asylum policy, as well as a widespread lack 
of formal common asylum policy within and outside of the European Union, creating 
structural problems in identifying, registering, redistributing, and integrating 
refugees into European countries.36 The Western Balkan states, especially those that 
are not EU member states are “left to manage the movement of refugees and 
migrants” themselves with little help from the EU.37 Nonetheless the EU plays an 
important role in the motivations of non-member states in the Western Balkans to 
prove effective in dealing with transnational problems, because states that have 
applied for EU membership seek to align with EU standards in order to secure 
potential membership.  
Cases for Analysis 
 
According to an article from The Economist published in 2009, “the war 
years and ensuing economic hardship have knocked the stuffing out of the Slavs of 
former Yugoslavia, leading to fewer children, lots of emigration and high abortion 
rates.”38 Today, the states of the Western Balkans possess varied levels of economic 
development, levels of democracy through political liberties and civil rights, and 
ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Additionally, states have seen various instances 
                                                 
36 Milica Mancic and Kristine Anderson, “Human rights and migration management 
in the Balkans: lessons learned, impact on EU accession and the way forward,” 
Migration Panorama Second Edition (2016): 11. 
37 Ibid. 
38 “A birth dearth,” The Economist, 12 November 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/14870080.  
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of state instability, including through rapid policy change, lack of rule of law, 
troubled democratic consolidation, government deficits and financial instability, and 
social tension between ethnic groups. Leadership dynamics and regime legitimacy, 
various levels of Europeanization, ethnic tensions, and capacity are just a few factors 
that highlight discrepancies between former Yugoslav countries and their 
contemporary development. According to Demetropoulou:  
“in most of the countries, struggle, lack of reform consensus, limited 
 democratic experience and weak institutions impeded politico-economic 
 progress; delayed and unimplemented reform programmes derailed the 
 countries from the path of fully functioning market economies leading to 
 inferior economic performance, declining living standards, rising 
 unemployment and increased poverty.”39  
The fall of Yugoslavia brought significant unrest, violence, and humanitarian 
emergency to the Western Balkans region. 
The current refugee crisis has greatly affected Serbia as Serbia was the 
earliest country to see a major influx of refugees from MENA after the Arab Spring 
in 2011. Serbia has hosted the largest population of displaced persons in Europe and 
has become a transit country, in which asylum seekers stay for an average of two 
days.40 In 2015, Serbia’s number of refugees per capita reached 0.130 
                                                 
39 Leeda Demetropoulou, “Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU 
Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe,” Southeast 
European Politics 3, no. 2-3 (2002): 88. 
40 Velina Lilyanova, “The Western Balkans: Frontline of the migration crisis,” 
European Parliament, January 2016, 4.  
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refugees/capita.41 Serbia has maintained an open borders policy throughout the 
refugee crisis in order to assist migrants transiting to the EU. Mancic and Anderson 
praise Serbia’s response to the refugee crisis, commending strengthened cooperation 
between Serbia’s civil society and government to appropriately respond to an influx 
of refugees, despite limited capacity.42 In 2013, 5,065 people applied for asylum in 
Serbia. This number tripled in 2014 to 16,500 asylum seekers.43 What Vladimir 
Petronijevic cites as the “migration-asylum nexus” represents the “cause and effect 
relationship between certain aspects of migration policy and the asylum system.”44 
Despite Serbia’s reputation as maintaining “refugee-friendly” policies, there are 
nonetheless reports of mistreatment of refugees.45 Closed EU borders mean full 
reception centers in Serbia, leaving vulnerable populations without proper protection 
and exacerbating strains on the Serbian government and civil society.46 The case of 
Serbia serves to illustrate the effects of an influx of asylum seekers on a government 
with mid-level range economic development, more recent economic growth, lower 
levels of freedom than Croatia according to Freedom House reports, and a country 
still in accession negotiations with the EU.  
                                                 
41 Self-calculated based on population data. 
42 Mancic and Anderson, 11. 
43 Vladimir Petronijevic, “Asylum and migration in Serbia: from ad-hoc responses to 
alignment with EU standards,” Migration Panorama Second Edition, (2016):14. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Lilyanova, 4. 
46 Tanja Fajon, “The EU and the Western Balkans: in need of a strategic 
partnership,” Migration Panorama Second Edition, (2016): 18. 
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Croatia became a major transit country for asylum seekers after the border 
between Serbia and Hungary was closed in 2015.47  Croatia’s refugee population was 
relatively low compared with the two other cases at 0.050 refugees/capita in 2015.48 
With the beginning of the influx, and a peak of about 12,000 migrants entering the 
country per day in September of 2015, the Croatian government set up a refugee 
camp near its border with Serbia.49 Thereafter, the government established a second 
camp for three times as many asylum seekers on the border with Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.50 As a member state of the EU, Croatia formally seeks to maintain EU 
requirements for asylum claims and irregular migrants. The EU’s Common European 
Asylum System requires that states uphold international law and, at minimum, 
“welcome asylum seekers in a dignified manner, ensuring they are treated fairly and 
that their case is examined to uniform standards.”51 Croatian officials have expressed 
willingness to participate in the EU’s relocation and resettlement program, including 
taking care of the sick and subsequently transporting them to the country’s borders 
                                                 
47 Tajana Sisgoreo, “Refugee Crisis in Croatia – Report,” Borderline Europe, 
accessed August 2017. http://www.borderline-
europe.de/sites/default/files/background/Refugee%20Crisis%20in%20Croatia%20Re
port.pdf.  
48 Self-calculated based on population data. 
49 Sisgoreo.  
50 Emma Buzinkic, “The European refugee crisis – the Croatian view,” Heinrich 
Boell Stiftung, 26 May 2016. https://www.boell.de/en/2016/05/24/european-refugee-
crisis-croatian-view.  
51 “Common European Asylum System,” Migration and Home Affairs of the 
European Commission, updated 14 December 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum_en.  
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with Hungary and Slovenia.52 The quota for the country would be 1,617 refugees 
accepted by the end of 2017.53  
Relative to Serbia and Macedonia, Croatia maintains a higher GDP and GDP 
per capita. Croatia represents an important case in the region because of its EU 
membership and financial stability relative to other countries in the region, as well as 
its “shortcut” to consolidated democracy and stability following the Balkan wars. 
However, Croatia has an aging and shrinking population and a less than ideal rate of 
unemployment at 13.8%.54 Croatia’s asylum policy and enforcement practices can be 
analyzed to understand what effects financial capacity and EU membership might 
have on the stability and robustness of the country before and during an increase in 
irregular migration in the form of asylum seekers.  
Because of Macedonia’s proximity to Greece, it is one of the largest hubs of 
transit migration in Europe. In 2015, Macedonia’s refugee population reached 0.230 
refugees/capita.55 This high number is partially the result of a small population in 
Macedonia relative to the other two case countries. Macedonia entered into EU 
candidacy in 2005, however has not yet begun accession negotiations.56 Of the three 
case countries, Macedonia is the least financially stable; “the lack of assistance and 
of the need to manage closer relations and financial support has been decisive” and 
                                                 
52 Sisgoreo.   
53 Ibid. 
54 “The World Bank in Croatia – Overview,” The World Bank, 20 April 2017. 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/croatia/overview.  
55 Self-calculated based on population data. 
56 “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” European Commission, 12 June 
2016. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-
information/fyrom_en.  
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has created a less robust political environment and overall greater instability in 
Macedonia.57 The EU’s individualized promotion of regional development in each 
country contributes to these inconsistencies in the development of stable countries in 
the Western Balkans. Because of Macedonia’s EU association status, “the country 
has proceeded towards a certain policy and institutional adjustment in compatibility 
with EU norms and practices.”58 The analysis of stability in Macedonia and the 
country’s ability to effectively and appropriately process asylum seekers will serve to 
illustrate the effects of large-scale irregular migration on a country with low levels of 
economic capacity, at the lowest level of EU accession candidacy of the states in the 
region, and with the highest general instability of the three cases.  
Measuring Stability in the Western Balkans 
 
 In order to analyze stability in these three countries before, during, and after 
the influx of asylum seekers from MENA, I have developed a framework through 
which to identify signs of stability/instability in these three Western Balkan countries 
based on indicators within three broad categories of stability: political stability, 
economy stability, and social stability. To measure political stability, first, I look at 
the extent to which rapid changes in policy related to refugees occurred in all three 
states, prior to the large-scale influx of asylum seekers from MENA. I discuss how 
the establishment and implementation of these policies has progressed throughout 
the years of the refugee crisis. The second indicator of political stability is the 
strength of rule of law in the three case countries. Lastly, I examine levels of 
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democracy in the case countries based on the Freedom House indices, which cite 
levels of political rights and civil liberties, pluralism, and authority trends on the 
ground as they are actually fulfilled (not as they are written in formal policy). Levels 
of democracy reveal the robustness of democratic consolidation in the case countries. 
Because Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia are at different stages of the 
democratization process, it is valuable to see how robust their democracies have 
become. Each of these indicators is explored in-depth in the “Effects of Migration on 
State Stability” section. The years from 2012 to 2016 include the major peaks of the 
influx of asylum seekers in the Western Balkans and reflect the prominent effects 
that this migration might have on the stability of the Western Balkan countries. 
Through using these measurements, it is clear that political stability has decreased in 
all three cases, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
 To analyze economic stability, I look at four indicators: public debt, 
government deficits, economic growth, and income levels. I utilize data from major 
reporting agencies, including the World Bank and other international and domestic 
organizations that provide statistics on country GDP and economic growth, levels of 
national debt and government deficits, as well as national country profiles and news 
reports to identify notable changes in economic conditions that might be attributed to 
the refugee crisis. In this section of my report, data on economic measures taken to 
provide for asylum seekers in the case countries are included to show the effects on 
host country economies of migration, including provisions for refugees such as 
shelter, food, transportation, labor to accommodate refugee influxes, and additional 
costs countries incur. Additional impacts countries experience also include economic 
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growth from large-scale migration due to increased economic activity and an 
increase in the host country’s income. Although we cannot yet analyze long-term 
economic effects of refugee influx in Western Balkan countries, we can nonetheless 
analyze short-term impacts and trajectories and identify effective methods of 
economic integration. I establish a connection between the refugee crisis and 
economic stability by identifying economic practices in response to the refugee crisis 
in Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia, and recognizing additional factors that might 
contribute to the conditions of their financial systems. 
 The primary indicator of social instability in the Western Balkans is ethnic 
tension. Macedonia has the most recent history of ethnic tension, which is one of the 
important reasons Macedonia has not acceded to the EU. Serbia has a lengthy history 
of ethnic tension with Albanians in Kosovo as well as a history of rampant 
nationalism that spread to other countries causing civil war. While Kosovo declared 
independence from Serbia in 2008, ethnic tensions remain a problem because of this 
Serb nationalism and the continuing insistence on behalf of Belgrade that Kosovo 
remains part of Serbia.59 Croatia is the most homogeneous of the three case 
countries, however a large Serb population remains. Increasing tensions between the 
two countries has led to hostilities between the Serb and Croat ethnic groups in 
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Croatia.60 Due to ethnic heterogeneity in each case, this indicator is paramount to an 
analysis of social stability. 
To measure ethnic tension, I look at instances of ethnic violence and hate 
crimes against asylum seekers, as well as levels of Islamophobia that have resulted in 
violence as recorded by independent organizations. Heightened ethnic violence 
correlates to heightened ethnic tensions, which allows for the operationalization and 
measurement of ethnic tension. Additionally, I examine ethno-nationalist discourse 
used in political circles, as well as in the media to determine whether ethno-
nationalism has increased since the influx of asylum seekers. Lastly, I examine 
transnational conflicts or conflicts that transcend national borders. Although not 
internal, transnational conflicts in a region where ethnic populations are interspersed 
in various sovereign territories might indicate larger instances of ethnic tension 
across borders.  
Effects of Migration on State Stability 
 
 The following sections reviews the literature published pertaining to the three 
broad categories by which I define stability: political stability, economic stability, 
and social stability. I define each of these terms as they are conceptualized in the 
subsequent chapters and I include reference to my framework for each indicator.  
Political Stability 
 
 The three indicators of political stability I analyze here are rapid change in 
migration policy of transit countries, the strength of rule of law, and the levels of 
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 20 
democracy. Additional literature on indicators of political stability is discussed 
below. 
Rapid Change in Migration Policy 
 
 Theories of state behavior are vast and uncertain. The international system is 
one, in which actors’ behavior cannot be predicted. Rather, the purpose of 
International Relations is “to explain broad patterns in classes of events.”61 One 
useful theory in predicting decision-making in International Relations is the 
organization theory, which recognizes the organization of governments and the small 
number of people involved in foreign policy decisions.62 David Welch writes: 
 “there is much greater stability in this institutional setting than there is in the 
 international environment. This contributes to stability in what leaders 
 believe about the world, and in how they deal with it.”63  
Boswell outlines the use of expert knowledge in public policy debates. Although a 
small number of individuals is involved in a state’s decision-making process, it is 
evident that the public plays a role in the selection and implementation of policy 
changes, which take place institutionally under the organization theory.  
In order to make policy changes, especially where a high degree of risk is 
involved, Boswell argues that these issues can and should be “settled on technocratic 
grounds.”64 This includes analyses of the social and economic effects of migrants in 
                                                 
61 David Welch, Painful Choices, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 
14.  
62 Ibid, 31. 
63 Ibid. 
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a particular area, as can be observed in other European states such as Germany and 
the UK.65 This is an example of “evidence-based policymaking” which will provide 
a lens through which I will analyze the institutional behavior of governments in 
regard to migration policy. Governmental behavior is understood as “outputs of large 
organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior.”66 I will use the 
following framework to determine the extent of rapid policy change in transit 
countries. 
I. The polity’s government implements a policy change through 
unofficial channels using expedited methods. 
II. Citizens are not informed of important policy changes regarding 
migration and asylum seekers.  
III. Hasty border closings are enacted without accounting for the number 
of asylum seekers already at the borders, resulting in unstable 
conditions at border sites and a large number of stranded asylum 
seekers.  
While Boswell’s conceptualization of government behavior does not recognize the 
inherent unpredictability of the international system, rather assumes that standard 
patterns of behavior exist in most circumstances, it does align with Welch’s 
organizational theory with its focus on institutional processes. This theory of state 
behavior will be used for the purposes of this thesis. 
                                                 
65 Boswell, 188. 
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 An influx of asylum seekers might induce rapid change in migration policy if 
a polity is attempting to quickly respond to unanticipated numbers of asylum seekers 
and, therefore, introduces new policies in an ineffective manner. I will use the 
categories very low, low, medium, high, and very high to describe the instances of 
rapid policy change in the case countries. 
Rule of Law 
 
The formal usage of the rule of law deals with the extent to which “behavior 
of individual persons and government authorities follows formal legal rules.”67 This 
is important in the case of democratic governments because a “state’s legal 
enforcement is intermeshed with the legitimating force of a legislative procedure that 
claims to be rational because it guarantees freedom.”68 Rule of law arguments in the 
literature “portray authoritarian regimes as highly capricious and unpredictable and 
democracies as constrained and more certain.”69 This certainty stems from the 
obligations attached to “each individual considered as a legal person, irrespective of 
social position, with the sole requirement that the individual in question has reached 
competent legal adulthood and has not been proven to suffer from 
some…disqualification” that is legally prescribed.70 These defined factors of the rule 
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of law, cited by Guillermo O’Donnell, focus on the role of equal treatment in the 
judicial system – equity of all before the law.71 
O’Donnell also provides a framework by which democratic rule of law 
should be examined. First, we must know the extent to which the legal system 
“behaves uniformly” in all circumstances. Second, the institutions that promote and 
enforce the laws set out in the constitution of the country are of utmost importance. 
Third, O’Donnell explains that the judiciary must be “free of undue influences from 
executive, legislative, and private interests” and the judiciary must not “abuse its 
autonomy for the pursuit of narrowly defined corporate interests.”72 Fourth, all state 
institutions besides judicial institutions must also practice fair treatment of everyone. 
Fifth, the right to the participation in political and social organizations exists. And 
lastly, O’Donnell highlights the importance of investigating human rights in the 
context of social position, gender, age, and geographical location of individuals.73 
The World Justice Project (WJP) is an organization that collects and analyzes data in 
order to strengthen the rule of law around the world. Although O’Donnell’s 
indicators for rule of law are comprehensive and significant, I will utilize the WJP’s 
Rule of Law Index for the purposes of this thesis, which is described below. The 
WJP Rule of Law Index is comprehensive in its analysis of rule of law and 
establishes a clear framework for comparing the three case countries. In the WJP’s 
index, there are four criteria for examining the importance of the rule of law:  
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I. “The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals 
and private entities are accountable under the law.  
II. The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just, are applied evenly, 
and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and 
property. 
III. The process by which laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is 
accessible, fair, and efficient. 
IV. Justice is delivered timely, by competent, ethical, and independent 
representatives and neutrals who are of sufficient number, have 
adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they 
serve.”74  
Rule of law is also provided in a set of conditions for lasting peace as outlined by 
Senghaas: “…rule of law should be maintained in keeping with a broadly accepted 
constitutionally and democratically adopted legal code.”75 Linz and Stepan describe 
rule of law’s “primary organizing principle” as the goal to “deliberately reduce 
uncertainty to promote mutual security” and “create ‘certainty that enables citizens to 
form long-term plans, which are a condition both for economic growth and for 
personal security.’”76 This suggests that rule of law is not only vital to liberal 
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democracy, but also to state security and stability in myriad different aspects. 
Although the characteristics of the rule of law and democracy are deeply intertwined, 
for the purposes of this project, I limit the definition of rule of law to issues related to 
the judiciary and law enforcement, while all other attributes will be examined in the 
democracy portion of my analysis.  
An influx of asylum seekers could influence the strength of rule of law if 
states are unable or unwilling to maintain the strength of rule of law in responding to 
the refugee crisis, through impeding justice for asylum seekers and refusing to 
uphold an asylum seeker’s rights. To describe changes in rule of law, I will 
categorize the cases along the following scale: decrease in strength of rule of law, 
little to no change in strength of rule of law, or increase in strength of rule of law. 
Levels of Democracy 
 
Democratic freedoms, argued by Alexander, are necessary for the prospect of 
stability. He posits that the mischaracterization of institutionalization of democracy 
is rampant because scholars have historically forgotten that states are governed by 
humans, not exclusively by policy.77 This sheds a new light on organization theory, 
by which we understand the institutional nature of government processes and state 
behavior. Insofar as stability is attributed to a sense of security and the ability for 
constituents to determine their own outcomes through an institutional process, 
aspects of democracy are vital to determining the political stability of a state. In the 
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case of European democracy, Schmitter posits that the EU requires democracy for 
enlargement, however does not itself practice democracy.78  
The most important aspect of democracy in this study is that of democratic 
consolidation and deterioration. Because the case countries are at various stages in 
their transitions to democracy, their levels of political stability would decrease if they 
experienced democratic deterioration. Schmitter’s argument is indicative of 
European democracy as a whole; the demise of European democracy could result in 
“unfulfilled contracts, multiple lawsuits, considerable disruptions in trade and capital 
flow, and…lots of resentment.”79 These potential effects of democratic deterioration 
both in EU member states and in neighboring countries in Europe are destabilizing to 
the polity and to the region more generally. 
Literature on democracy is extensive and scholars debate whether democracy 
can be measured on a scale, as well as what factors affect the status of a country 
transitioning to democracy. While democracy is cited as more certain than 
authoritarian regimes, some experts on democratization posit that democracy is 
inherently uncertain. This uncertainty can “threaten…the interests” of some actors.80 
However, the added bonus of democracy is that, in instances when actors lose, there 
remains the “positive value of democracy’s opportunities for future winning.”81 This 
additional point makes pursuing democracy all the more relevant for post-conflict 
states like the Western Balkans seeking both state stability and EU accession. 
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Although many actors in these states “lost” during the years of turmoil after the fall 
of Yugoslavia, through democratic transitions, they locked in the ability to win in the 
future. This means that democratic institutions allow for citizens to make choices 
regarding governance. For these reasons, a robust democratic system can indicate 
political stability. More importantly in the cases in this project, however, is the 
stability inherent in effective consolidation of democracy after the process of 
democratization has already begun. While the definition of a consolidated democracy 
is largely debated, O’Donnell supports Dahl’s concept of polyarchy as the line that 
separates democracies and nondemocracies. Consolidation of democracy refers to 
the institutionalization of polyarchy, which is made up of elected officials, free and 
fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, 
alternative information, and associational autonomy.82 
The consolidation of democracy in cases where there is a long history of 
ethnic conflict requires the submergence of ethnic problems to create national 
unity.83 Successful democratization would indicate both political stability in the 
bodies of government and social stability in the absence of ethnic problems. If these 
countries were to experience extensive democratic backsliding, instability would 
arise through reemerging ethnic tensions and changes in governance. Even in states 
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where fair and free elections are held, this does not necessarily ensure political 
stability, as is the case in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. 84  
In order to measure democracy, I will use the rankings provided in the 
Freedom House index, derived from the following criteria: 
I. Levels of political rights and civil liberties as enjoyed by 
individuals, affected by both state and non-state actors. 
II. Pluralism and the right to organize into various political 
parties, with the potential for mobility in these groups. 
III. The role of the government in the polity, including the election 
of government officials and the involvement of the citizens in 
political discourse. 
These align with the pursuits highlighted by O’Donnell under the notion of the 
democratic rule of law, including participation in political and social organizations, 
balance of power between branches of government, and human rights more broadly. 
I separate these issues from those of the judiciary and law enforcement in order to 
avoid conflating rule of law and democracy as indicators of political stability.  
 Asylum seekers might impact levels of democracy if the polity responds to a 
crisis by stripping individuals of certain political rights and civil liberties, including 
those of the asylum seekers. Democratic backsliding in countries that have already 
begun democratizing would cause political instability. I will categorize each case’s 
change in levels of democracy using the following scale: notable decrease in levels 
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of democracy, little to no change in levels of democracy, and notable increase in 
levels of democracy.  
Economic Stability 
 
  In terms of economic benefits from immigration, it is clear in many 
circumstances that immigrants provide “production complementarities between 
immigrant workers and other factors of production.”85 However, this is dependent on 
the integration of immigrants into the labor force, which takes place only after 
immigrants have been in the host country for a long period of time. Asylum seekers 
in transit countries only intend to stay for a short period of time before they move on 
to a destination country. Because it is difficult to collect and obtain data on the 
impact of irregular migrants, for the purposes of this thesis, I speculate that there are 
similarities between the economic effects of asylum seekers and the economic effects 
of regular migrants on the host country, on which a significant amount of literature 
has previously been published. The following section will review the limited 
literature that exists regarding economic effects of refugees, as well as literature on 
the economic impacts of migrants on the host country. 
It is difficult to obtain information on the economic impacts of refugees on 
host countries for three reasons: “a lack of before-and-after data to estimate impacts 
of new and often unexpected refugee influxes, the complex effects refugees can have 
on host-country economies, and the infeasibility of an experimental approach to 
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identify refugee impacts.”86 Although the two subjects are not interchangeable, some 
insights can be gathered from this literature. The major difference between refugees 
and migrants and their effects on states’ economies is that “refugees’ displacement is 
involuntary and often temporary, whereas most migrants choose their destination and 
duration in the host economy, unless contracted specifically for temporary work.”87 
As mentioned above, it is important to note what part of the labor market is taken up 
by asylum seekers in host countries. Some theories posit that asylum seekers do not 
take up space in the regular labor market, rather are employed in the “shadow sector 
without the participation of native workers.”88 This would mean that the income of 
native workers is not affected by an influx of asylum seekers. In contrast, in 
situations where irregular migrants work within the formal labor market, but for 
lower wages, the wages of the native population will be affected.89 This aligns with 
predictions made by an anonymous contributor to The Economist who stated in 2015, 
“Europe’s new arrivals will probably dent public finances, but not wages,” revealing 
the expected financial outcomes of migrant or refugee influxes.90  
Additional international aid can have an impact where exogenous sources 
account for the money countries spend on accommodating large numbers of 
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refugees. Simulations conducted in tandem with the Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences reveal that, when refugees interact with the economy around 
them, “this can create positive income spillovers for host-country households.”91 The 
World Bank, in particular, produced a 2017 report on the topic of migration and 
mobility in Europe and Central Asia. According to this report, economies can 
“benefit from cross-border labor mobility.”92 There are limitations to migration that 
depend on a country’s capacity to receive and integrate them. However, the refugee 
crisis in transit countries is temporary and makes it difficult for irregular migrants to 
integrate into the local labor market under these circumstances, especially because 
they have not yet been granted refugee status and are not privy to the benefits that 
come from this status.93 
Economic stability is vital to the overall stability of a polity and is 
intertwined with political and social stability in various ways, including in a polity’s 
capacity to implement various changes. George Leland Bach suggests in his 1950 
publication in the American Economic Association journal that economic stability 
stems from two necessary conditions: growth of national real output at an optimum 
rate and constancy of some index prices – conditions for orderly business and 
individual planning.94 For the purposes of this thesis, I concentrate on the following 
set of data related to the indicators listed above. Government debt and deficit will be 
analyzed based on the following factors: 
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I. Levels of borrowing from outside actors, including both state and 
non-state actors. 
II. States’ management of debt payments.  
III. Emergency spending on asylum seekers and/or infrastructure to 
accommodate asylum seekers.  
IV. Foreign funding proportionate to the number of asylum seekers within 
a country’s borders.  
Large government debt and deficits might signal a polity’s inability to control its 
spending and large-scale borrowing could point to problems with import and export 
balances. Asylum seekers might impact a polity’s debt and/or deficits by requiring 
unanticipated excess spending on the part of the state. The refugee crisis has cost 
polities and other non-state actors hefty sums, including in infrastructure to register 
and process asylum seekers and housing and other basic necessities for the 
vulnerable. In most cases, foreign aid is pumped into countries, but to what extent? If 
emergency spending requires polities to take out loans from exogenous actors that 
the countries are then unable to pay back, asylum seekers could negatively impact 
economic stability. Additionally, if foreign aid is not proportionate to the need of a 
country based on number of refugees and economic capabilities, this will also affect 
the economic stability of the host country. To categorize each country’s change in 
government debt and public deficit, I will use the following scale: notable increase in 
government debt/public deficit, little to no change in government debt/public deficit, 
and notable decrease in government debt/public deficit, where these two indicators 
are separated.  
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Economic growth and GDP data will include: 
I. The growth or decline of national economies in recent years, 
including recessions and plateaus. 
II. Income inequality among the population. 
Economic growth and levels of income in these countries also indicate economic 
stability insofar as countries with high GDPs that continually grow show more 
financial stability and healthier economies. Asylum seekers might cause economic 
instability through stalling a state’s economy if the state prioritizes the refugee crisis 
over other economic measures, such as growth initiatives. I categorize changes in 
economic growth and income using the following scale: notable economic shrinkage, 
economic stagnation, or notable economic growth. 
Social Stability 
 
Ethno-Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict 
 
Additional scholarship on the effects of migration on state security and 
stability posits that constraints to opening borders to migrants “are likely to be 
political, resting upon a concern that an influx of people belonging to another ethnic 
community may generate xenophobic sentiments, conflicts between natives and 
migrants, and the growth of anti-migrant right-wing parties.”95 Although Weiner 
describes these phenomena as “political,” I separate ethnic concerns into a separate 
category I call social stability. Weiner does not discredit the role played by economic 
factors in international migration, however he emphasizes the added political 
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motivations behind state response to international migration. Perceived threats by 
migrants can include attacks by groups of armed refugees, migrants’ effects on 
political stability, or migrants’ threats to the major societal values of the receiving 
country.96 These perceived threats vary insofar as states have differing ideas of 
security and regard different characteristics of their country – the receiving country – 
as most important.97 Based on the migration trends at the time of publication, Weiner 
cited the most plausible reason for states to accept or reject refugees or migrants is 
“ethnic affinity.”98 Although this singular reason is not sufficient to describe state 
behavior in response to large-scale migration, we see the role played by ethnicity in 
states where ethnic homogeneity might lead citizens to regard the ethnic makeup and 
the upholding of distinct values to be the most important characteristic and, 
therefore, the most important to protect against perceived threats. 
Yugoslav successor states experienced ethno-nationalism through rhetoric of 
various leaders after the fall of communism and the disintegration of the state. 
Additionally, Karin Dyrstad’s influential 2012 article examines the effects of civil 
war on ethno-nationalism, positing that ethno-nationalism is not necessarily seen to 
increase following civil war as previously assumed.99 In order to understand ethno-
nationalism as it is used both in Dyrstad’s research and this thesis, I will provide 
definitions for relevant terms. Ethnicity is defined as “an identity based on traits 
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associated with or believed to be associated with descent.”100 Ethnicities are 
“complex” and dynamic, as well as not mutually exclusive.101 Nationalism is defined 
here as “loyalty to a nation or a group,” contrasting definitions by scholars such as 
Connor who see it as loyalty to a physical state.102 Taking these two concepts, 
Dyrstad defines ethno-nationalism as “a desire to keep the (ethnic) nation 
homogeneous and separated from other groups, where loyalty to the group is 
stronger than loyalty to the state.”103  
Ethnic conflict takes place when groups fight to keep their ethnic nation and 
sometimes their state homogeneous and isolated from other out-groups. When states 
experience internal or external conflict, it is a threat to the state’s security and virtues 
of daily life and, therefore, contributes to state instability. Although the effects of 
ethno-nationalism on ethnic conflict have been widely studied, Dyrstad’s unique 
approach explains levels of ethno-nationalism following ethnic conflict. 
Additionally, “human rights issues and refugee situations represent one level in 
which nations are closely interlinked by ethnic conflict.”104 This highlights the 
important role that ethno-nationalism plays in situations of refugee migration. In 
examining levels of ethno-nationalism and the potential for ethnic conflict in 
contemporary situations, we can determine the robustness of state stability. Through 
understanding the effects of ethnic conflict on levels of ethno-nationalism, we can 
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appreciate the modern-day levels of stability in the Western Balkans based on these 
levels and analyze the effects of refugee migration on these levels. Existing ethnic 
tensions in Macedonia involve the Muslim Albanian minority. In Serbia, current 
ethnic tensions are likewise associated with Albanians in Kosovo. Historical ethnic 
violence perpetuated by Serbs involved Bosnian Muslims. For these reasons, 
changes in levels of Islamophobia is an important indicator of social stability in the 
case countries. In Croatia, tensions are less associated with ethnic groups with 
Muslim majorities. Nonetheless, Croatia has seen ethnic violence against asylum 
seekers within its borders. Additionally, it is important to differentiate between Islam 
as it is practiced in Western Balkan states and Islam as it is practiced by a majority of 
asylum seekers from MENA. These issues are discussed in the chapter on social 
stability. In my analysis of social stability, I focus on the following factors under the 
category of ethnic violence: 
I. Levels of ethnic violence and hate crimes in the case 
countries. 
II. Levels of Islamophobia as measured by independent 
organizations. 
III. Negative feelings toward migration, generally. 
As outsiders cross borders into the case countries, the population could experience 
heightened levels of Islamophobia and ethnic tensions leading to increased violence 
and increased hate crimes. This would indicate social instability. I categorize each 
case’s changes in ethnic violence using the following scale: increase in instances of 
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ethnic violence, little to no change in instances of ethnic violence, or decrease in 
instances of ethnic violence. 
Ethno-nationalist discourse might indicate social instability if: 
I. Political figures use nationalism in their platforms to 
discourage an influx of asylum seekers.  
II. There is an emergence and popular support of populist 
movements in the case countries. 
III. There is widespread use of ethno-nationalist discourse, 
sensationalism, and fear-mongering in media consumed by the 
public. 
If the population of a country harbors resentment or other negative feelings toward 
asylum seekers, political figures could capitalize on nationalist rhetoric to gain 
support of this demographic. Groups of extreme ethno-nationalists commit actions 
that are destabilizing, including ethno-nationalist violence, radical religious turmoil, 
and secessionist strife.105 
Transnational conflict will be analyzed through the lens of social stability through 
examining: 
I. Border disputes with neighboring countries, especially those 
that have resulted from an influx of asylum seekers at 
particular borders. 
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II. “Tit-for-tat” as a method to retaliate against neighboring 
countries due to a lack of coordination in responding to the 
refugee crisis. 
Because asylum seekers cross international borders, it is vital to social stability that 
border disputes because of asylum seekers are mitigated. If countries experience 
border disputes due to discrepancies in responses to the refugee crisis, this would be 
an example of the refugee crisis affecting transnational conflict and exacerbating 
social instability. Post-conflict countries are more vulnerable to these kinds of 
escalations. 
Summary of Contents 
 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into four subsequent chapters, 
including a final analysis of the data and concluding remarks. Chapter Two focuses 
on political stability and the three indicators of political stability in each state. 
Chapter Three focuses on economic stability and the relationship between the 
refugee crisis and the financial state of the case countries, including data based on 
the indicators discussed above. Chapter Four discusses the connection between the 
refugee crisis and social stability in the case countries and primarily discusses ethnic 
tensions and levels of ethno-nationalism in the case countries before, during, and 
after the major peaks of the refugee crisis. Following these substantive chapters, the 
final chapter analyzes the data, make observations, and provide conclusions aimed at 
helping establish best practices for Western Balkan countries, as well as present 
questions for further research.  
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Chapter 2: 
Political Stability in the Western Balkans 
 
Introduction 
 
While much of the literature surrounding irregular immigration and migration 
generally deals with the economic impacts such movements of people have on host 
and origin countries, there are equally important political factors that determine 
stability, which can be and often are affected by large-scale migration. In 
conjunction with this idea, Weiner states, “the reluctance of states to open their 
borders to all who wish to enter is only partly a concern over economic effects. The 
constraints are as likely to be political.”106 Two important political factors of 
migration cited by Weiner are: that “international population movements are often 
impelled, encouraged, or prevented by governments or political forces” and even 
when economic factors induce people to emigrate, “it is governments that decide 
whether immigrants should be allowed to enter.”107 Weiner adds that these decisions 
are seldom based on economic considerations, rather political factors are often more 
critical to state decision-making.108  
In this section, I discuss the political effects of migration, including internal 
political disorder in three different categories that might signal internal political 
instability.  Political stability in the Western Balkans varies from state to state and 
my evaluation of political stability in the Western Balkans includes the following 
indicators of political instability: rapid policy change, the strength of rule of law, and 
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the levels of democracy in each of the three case countries. As discussed in the 
literature review, it is significant to note that rapid changes in policy related to 
migration and asylum could signal political instability because of a lack of 
coordination between government officials and the people in the country who are 
legally obligated to adhere to new policies, even if they have not been informed of 
such changes in government policy. Second, a key hallmark of the rule of law is an 
effective judiciary and low levels of corruption, which are used in this chapter to 
indicate the status of rule of law. Democratic institutions are required by the EU for 
accession into the EU community and, while some post-Yugoslav countries have 
(arguably) successfully implemented democratic reforms – Croatia and Slovenia – 
others have a long way to go in successfully obtaining a functioning liberal 
democracy. Macedonia and Serbia, for example, are at differing stages of EU 
accession talks. Since the Balkan Wars, both Serbia and Macedonia have struggled 
in various ways to effectively maintain democratic freedoms without the aid of the 
EU, due to their non-membership statuses. Additionally, since Croatia’s accession to 
the EU, the state has not maintained democratic freedoms to the extent it had 
achieved prior to accession, resulting in democratic backsliding.109  
Data 
 
Rapid Change in Migration Policy 
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 All three countries analyzed in this thesis are party to the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, as well as the 1967 Protocol.110 This codifies 
legal obligations that all three countries are required to uphold in regard to asylum 
seekers within their borders. Additionally, the EU has certain regulations vis-à-vis 
refugees that are to be upheld by member states.111 Croatia’s, Serbia’s, and 
Macedonia’s policies on asylum seekers strive to be compliant with EU regulations – 
Croatia as a member state and Serbia and Macedonia as candidate states. However, 
Croatia and Serbia have been more successful in implementing these regulations. 
Adjustments to asylum policies nonetheless occurred in these case countries during 
the years of the refugee crisis in response to changing conditions. Through both news 
sources and other agencies, I determine the policy changes that occurred in response 
to the refugee crisis in the case countries and the effects these policy changes had on 
political stability in the countries.  
Rule of Law 
 
 The World Justice Project’s (WJP) set of criteria for rule of law makes up the 
organization’s index for analyzing and strengthening the rule of law in countries 
around the world. Each year the WJP publishes its report on rule of law in the 
countries of the world, breaking down data by region, state, and different facets of 
rule of law. In this section, I wuse the WJP’s published reports to provide and 
analyze data on the progression of rule of law initiatives in the case countries in 
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order to identify areas where the rule of law has changed – improved or deteriorated 
– over time. Additional sources give supplementary information on the rule of law 
initiatives of various countries and potential motives behind implementing reforms 
that may or may not be consistently enforced.  
Levels of Democracy 
 
 The Freedom House Index of Nations in Transit and annual report, Freedom 
in the World, focus on several aspects of democracy in order to produce aggregate 
scores of the states’ levels of democracy and freedom. The categories Freedom 
House analyzes to score states’ levels of democracy are: national democratic 
governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic 
governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. Freedom House 
attributes scores to countries on a scale from 1 to 7, 1 being the most democratic and 
7 being the least democratic. This index has published data on all three case 
countries every year since the Arab Spring in 2011 that initiated large-scale 
migration into Europe from MENA. Additionally, Freedom House ranks the 
countries in transit – formerly communist countries implementing democratic 
reforms – on a comparative scale.112  
In an effort to consolidate data and present a concise analysis of political 
stability in the Western Balkans, each country is given its own section, in which 
examples of all three aspects of political stability discussed above are introduced and 
examined. 
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Political Stability in Croatia 
 
 Croatia and Slovenia were the first countries to secede from united 
Yugoslavia in 1991, with Macedonia declaring independence only several months 
later.113 22 years later, Croatia formally acceded to the EU on July 1, 2013.114 The 
EU maintains clear requirements for the state of governance in accession countries 
and the EU attempts to prevent backsliding by creating more robust criteria for EU 
accession. This does not ensure, however, that Croatia has not and will not 
experience political instability, regardless of its EU status. Croatia’s implementation 
of migration and refugee policy in coordination with the EU, the rule of law, levels 
of democracy, and other contemporary political crises are discussed below against a 
timeline of the refugee crisis in the Western Balkans. 
Rapid Policy Change in Croatia 
 
 Croatia became an integral part of the Western Balkans migration route in 
2015, when Serbia directed asylum seekers through Croatia after the closure of the 
border between Serbia and Hungary.115 As a member of the EU, Croatia’s migration 
and asylum policy must comply with the relevant EU regulations.116 Prior to the 
refugee crisis within its borders, Croatia’s EU accession in 2013 brought about 
relevant policy changes in the area of migration and refugees, including 
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implementation of the Common European Asylum System and open borders. 
However, the accession process prior to 2013 led Croatia to implement policies in 
compliance with EU regulations before its official membership in the EU. Therefore, 
these cannot be considered rapid changes, as implementation of these policies came 
aided by the EU and in the years leading up to Croatia’s accession and the refugee 
crisis. Additionally, these policies were enacted through proper channels in the 
Croatian government, signaling pressure from the EU for implementation of these 
initiatives. 
 After 2015’s influx of over 200,000 asylum seekers through Serbia, Croatia 
experienced some rapid policy change in response to the humanitarian crisis in the 
Western Balkans. Croatia implemented the Act on International and Temporary 
Protection, which replaced an outdated Act on Asylum. According to a 2015 report 
on Croatia’s migration policy, this act was primarily implemented to transpose EU 
directives into the Croatia’s domestic sphere.117 Additionally, the Dublin procedure, 
which establishes which country is responsible for review of an asylum seeker’s 
application saw a series of changes in response to the influx of asylum seekers.118 
Croatia accepted very few asylum requests in 2015 and in the years since due to the 
application of the Dublin Regulation, which assigns the role of registering asylum 
seekers to the first Member State an asylum seeker enters.119 Since its adoption in 
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2003, it has been revealed that the Dublin Regulation places disproportionate 
pressure on member states that lie on the external border of the EU.120 
 Perhaps the most drastic change in Croatia’s migration and asylum policy 
occurred in 2016 when the state decided to introduce new border restrictions. As the 
gravity of the refugee crisis in Croatia sunk in, Croatia began limiting the number of 
asylum seekers the country would let into their borders to 580 per day in February.121 
Less than a month later, Croatia closed the borders to asylum seekers wishing to 
transit to other countries.122 The effects of this announcement were wide-reaching 
leaving large numbers of asylum seekers stranded at the border between Serbia and 
Croatia. Border closings were hastily enforced, without extensive publicity on new 
policy.  
 Overall, Croatia did not experience significant rapid migration policy 
changes in the years leading up to and during the refugee crisis. Therefore, Croatia is 
categorized as very low in instances of rapid migration policy change. 
Rule of Law in Croatia 
 
According to the Freedom House report in 2013, rule of law institutions 
consistently underperformed, due to a corrupt and slow judiciary. In 2005, Croatia 
became party to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which 
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encouraged countries to support national measures to combat corruption.123 A 2009 
initiative related to the UNCAC included a peer review process of national 
implementation of anti-corruption reform.124 Croatia was part of the first wave of this 
process in 2010-2011. This particular study conducted by the UN examines the 
personal experience of Croatians with corruption and attempts to give an in-depth 
picture of the pervasiveness of corruption in the country. The details of these results 
are given below.  
 In a 2010 survey, it was determined that Croatians on average believe 
corruption to be one of the major issues faced by the country and these conclusions 
were drawn from individuals’ experiences with direct bribery by a variety of 
officials.125 Unfortunately, corruption did not diminish with time. A 2017 study 
conducted by Ernst and Young reveals that of the Southeast European countries – 
Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Ukraine –  Croatia has the highest levels of corruption.126 According to these results, 
there is still a significant portion of the judiciary that remains corrupt and efforts in 
implementing rule of law in order to achieve EU accession have become politically 
motivated and, therefore, unsustainable in Croatia’s long-term development. 
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 Croatia’s WJP report from 2014 – the year before the major influx of asylum 
seekers into the country – lists Croatia at a 0.57 out of 1.0 where the greater number 
corresponds to higher adherence to rule of law. Croatia’s lowest three categories on 
WJP’s scale in 2014 were: open government, regulatory enforcement, and civil 
justice.127 This data aligns with Freedom House’s analysis that Croatia’s judiciary is 
both slow and corrupt. Croatia’s WJP report from 2016 assigns Croatia a score of 
0.61, a .04 increase in adherence to rule of law.128 While levels of regulatory 
enforcement and civil justice remained approximately the same, open government 
increased significantly, meaning that civic participation has increased since 2014.  
Although Croatia has not seen a significant decrease in strength of rule of law 
in the years following the peak of the refugee crisis, rule of law adherence did not 
see any large-scale increases. This would suggest that the rule of law in Croatia was 
not strongly affected by the refugee crisis, leaving Croatia in the little to no change 
in strength of rule of law category. 
Democracy in Croatia 
 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index shows that the year prior to 
Croatia’s accession to the EU and the year Croatia acceded (2012-2013) saw the best 
democracy scores in the country in the last decade. Since EU accession in 2013, 
Croatia has progressively received higher democracy scores, where higher 
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democracy scores mean less democratic. What accounts for this backsliding? There 
are a number of factors identified by Freedom House and other sources to explain 
why Croatia has become less democratic since 2013. Prior to its EU accession, 
Croatia was awarded a democracy score of 3.61 in Freedom House’s Nations in 
Transit index, identifying it as a semi-consolidated democracy.129 Amid Croatia’s 
accession to the EU, concerns still abounded in reference to the “baggage of 
inadequately reformed institutions” that were unlikely to be reformed and 
strengthened in tandem with or due to EU accession.130  
In 2014 Freedom House’s Nations in Transit index scored Croatia at a 3.68, 
which classified Croatia as a semi-consolidated democracy.131 As expected from the 
data examined from the World Justice Project, Croatia’s highest (worst) scores were 
in the categories of independent media, judicial framework and independence, and 
corruption. In Freedom House’s 2017 report, Croatia scored a 3.71, a slight decrease 
in democratic robustness from its 2014 level.132 This slight decrease can be explained 
by the introduction of a new government in Croatia in 2016. Polarization in the 
country escalated between the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and a new party 
called Most, which formed a coalition to make up the first government of 2016. New 
elections were called for in the fall after a vote of no confidence ousted the HDZ 
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leader Tomislav Karamarko as prime minister.133 The HDZ then voted Andrej 
Plenkovic to head the party in the second government of 2016. Tensions between the 
two parties remained under this government but were seemingly addressed in order 
to avoid escalation.134 
 Croatia’s democratic backsliding is significant, not entirely unexpected, and 
not attributable to the refugee crisis. Rather Croatia’s newly elected government 
which took office in 2016 is responsible for high political tensions and political 
instability. Nonetheless, Croatia still maintains the Nations in Transit score of a 
semi-consolidated democracy. For these reasons, Croatia is categorized as having 
seen a notable decrease in democracy. 
Political Stability in Serbia 
 
Rapid Policy Change in Serbia 
 
 The Asylum Act and the General Administrative Procedure Act are two 
policies that, in tandem with one another, deal with the legal aspects of claiming 
asylum in Serbia. Most transiting asylum seekers wish to apply for asylum in EU 
countries. This has changed somewhat as some asylum seekers have been forced to 
spend long periods of time in Serbia and mobility has been restricted. Throughout 
the refugee crisis, Serbia has largely maintained a policy of open borders to asylum 
seekers. This, however, does not ensure that Serbia has the capacity to provide for 
and protect these large numbers of asylum seekers. Due to Serbia’s status as an EU 
candidate country since 2012, Serbia has attempted to uphold EU regulations vis-a-
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vis asylum seekers.135 The Serbian government began drafting a new asylum law in 
2013 called the Draft Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection.136 Aside from 
these policies, Serbia has not experienced dramatic or rapid policy change since the 
peak of the migration crisis.  
 Serbia’s primary problems deal not with effective policy, rather with 
effective implementation. Serbia has been regarded as “a positive actor in the 
migration crisis with its open borders policy, political discourse and public attitudes 
assessed as refugee-friendly.”137 Despite the praise Serbia has garnered during the 
refugee crisis, there are some areas where faulty implementation of policy has led to 
difficulties faced by asylum seekers in the country. Some of these include slow 
registration procedures, poor reception conditions, and a lack of state-funded 
psychological aid.138 To address some of these problems, Serbia has resorted to 
taking short-term measures instead of implementing a “broader reform process.”139 
In the long term, Serbia has, in tandem with the EU, committed to amending the 
Asylum Act in order to strengthen capacities. This represents Serbia’s transition into 
a period of gradual reforms to make their policies more compliant with the EU 
acquis. This move is primarily motivated by Serbia’s candidate status and the EU 
requirement that certain benchmarks should be met in order to Serbia’s membership 
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negotiations can go forward. These amendments to the Asylum Act are being 
reviewed by the Serbian parliament during the writing of this thesis.  
 Although Serbia does not have a recent history of rapid policy change in 
regard to asylum seekers, there are efforts being made by the Serbian government 
and governments of neighboring states to more effectively process asylum seekers 
and, in some cases, transfer them between borders. This highlights a major difference 
between Serbia and Croatia insofar as Croatia has greater capabilities in processing 
asylum seekers but stricter refugee policies while Serbia, struggling with national 
capacity to properly process asylum seekers, maintains an open borders policy. 
Serbia has a low level of rapid policy change, but none that has led to significant 
political instability stemming directly from the refugee crisis. 
Rule of Law in Serbia 
 
 To study rule of law in Serbia both before and after the major influx of 
asylum seekers, I began in an earlier year than in the case of Croatia because the 
major influx of asylum seekers in Serbia occurred 1-2 years earlier than in Croatia. 
This is because large influxes of asylum seekers did not enter Croatia until the border 
between Serbia and Hungary was closed. In the 2012 WJP report, Serbia was 
awarded a score of 0.51 adherence to rule of law.140 Serbia’s major problem 
categories in this report included order and security and fundamental rights. In 2016, 
Serbia was awarded a score of 0.50.141 Order and security remained the biggest 
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obstacles to rule of law adherence, followed by fundamental rights, and open 
government. While fundamental rights improved slightly in the years since 2012, 
open government deteriorated somewhat in the years of these same years, which 
include the peak influx of the refugee crisis. Civil conflict under the broad category 
order and security is the most problematic, scoring a 1.0 in adherence to rule of law. 
This might indicate political instability if this represented a major deterioration in 
rule of law adherence since 2012, however this subcategory remains unchanged from 
the 2012 level.   
 According to Freedom House reports from both 2012 and 2016, corruption is 
a major problem in Serbia, including in the judiciary. However, measures taken in 
the early 2000s include an Anti-Corruption Council aew3nd an Anti-Corruption 
Agency. Although these are not new initiatives to combat corruption, they 
nonetheless play a critical role in Serbia’s push to meet EU membership criteria. 
Despite these measures, the judiciary has also experienced major setbacks, including 
lengthy trials.142 Citizens also have problems accessing Serbian courts and legislative 
processes because of “high fees and attorney costs, as well as due to the lack of 
uniformly available legal aid.”143 Transparency International claims that former 
Serbian prime minister and now president Aleksander Vucic has primarily led the 
fight against corruption. Before his time as prime minister, Vucic headed the largest 
party in the Serbian parliament and used this as a platform to initiate takedowns of 
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corrupt officials.144 The problem, outlined by Transparency International, in Serbia’s 
fight against corruption is the lack of a systematic approach to dealing with 
corruption on a large scale. EU oversight is generally considered a positive influence 
on Serbia’s fight against corruption. However, measurements from international 
organizations have yet to see a notable difference in corruption practices since before 
the refugee crisis began.  
Due to high levels of corruption, Serbia has seen little to no change in the 
strength of rule of law due to the refugee crisis. 
Democracy in Serbia 
 
 According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index, Serbia’s 
democracy scores did not change between 2012 and 2016. Serbia is categorized as a 
free country and has maintained a democracy score of 2.0 since the beginning of the 
refugee crisis.145 However, under Freedom House’s Nations in Transit index, Serbia 
was categorized as a semi-consolidated democracy both in 2012 and in 2016.146 
However, Serbia’s Nations in Transit score has somewhat deteriorated since the 
beginning of the refugee crisis. While Serbia’s score remained stagnant from 2012-
2014 at 3.64/7, Serbia’s 2015 score decreased to 3.68 due to a slight deterioration in 
independent media and decreased again in 2016 to 3.75 due to a slight deterioration 
                                                 
144 “Serbia: Hopefully a New Government Renews the Fight Against Corruption,” 
Transparency International, published 21 March 2014. 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/serbia_hopefully_a_new_government_re
news_the_fight_against_corruption.   
145 “Serbia 2012,” Freedom in the World, accessed October 2017. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/serbia.  
146 “Serbia 2017,” Freedom House Nations in Transit, accessed October 2017. 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/serbia.  
 54 
in national democratic governance and independent media. Serbia’s 2017 score is a 
3.82/7, due to a prolonged election cycle election irregularities in the 2016 
elections.147 Although Serbia and Croatia are both categorized under this framework 
as semi-consolidated democracies, Serbia is currently categorized as less democratic 
than Croatia.  
Thus, I have categorized Serbia as having a notable decrease in democracy 
that coincides with the refugee crisis. The decrease in Serbia’s level of democracy is 
more likely to stem from the election irregularities in the 2016 elections, rather than 
the influx of asylum seekers. 
Political Stability in Macedonia 
 
Rapid Policy Change in Macedonia 
 
 Out of the three case countries, Macedonia has been the most destabilized by 
the refugee crisis. Due to Macedonia’s most recent problems with ethnic tensions, 
this is not unexpected. Macedonia has been unable to effectively handle the refugee 
crisis within its borders because of “weak and fragile institutions [and] a problematic 
rule of law and already in deep internal political crisis since 2014.”148 Macedonia did 
not have a cohesive and organized response to the refugee crisis either in its formal 
policy or in implementation.149 A comprehensive overview of the crisis and 
Macedonia’s response is given by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 
by Aleksander Lj Spasov who delineates between three phases of the refugee crisis 
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in Macedonia. These phases are important in understanding rapid policy change in 
Macedonia.  
 At the beginning of the refugee crisis, asylum seekers were treated as illegal 
immigrants instead of as asylum seekers and were detained in horrible conditions in 
asylum centers that were evidently “never meant to be functional” based of the 
disrepair of the facilities.150 Authorities did not know how they should deal with an 
influx of asylum seekers and this shows a weakness in policy, as well as in 
implementation of asylum policy in Macedonia. The second phase, explains Spasov, 
began when large numbers of asylum seekers were transported via train to Serbia and 
then further to EU countries.151 This resulted in Macedonian authorities opening 
borders to asylum seekers but refusing to or simply unable to register them under 
proper procedures. Eventually, Frontex stepped in and aided Macedonian authorities 
in the registration process of asylum seekers. The last phase of Macedonia’s response 
to the refugee crisis began when, in 2015, a metal fence was constructed to close off 
borders and violent clashes broke out between police and army forces and asylum 
seekers.152 These events were then used by right-wing populist officials as rhetoric to 
maintain the “European Christian world” by acting as a “gatekeeper.”153 These hasty 
decisions to block asylum seekers from entering Macedonia through Greece indicate 
rapid policy shifts. One particular policy that led to unrest was the categorization of 
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Afghan migrants as “economic migrants,” which disqualified them from seeking 
political asylum in Macedonia.154  
 Out of the three case countries, Macedonia has experienced the highest 
number of instances of rapid migration policy change, placing it in the medium 
category. 
Rule of Law in Macedonia 
 
 Macedonia’s 2014 WJP score was recorded at a 0.58 adherence to rule of 
law.155 Macedonia’s three weakest areas for adherence to rule of law in 2014 were 
order and security, fundamental rights, and open government. Like Serbia, 
Macedonia’s greatest weakness in rule of law adherence is civil conflict, scored at a 
1.0. In 2016, Macedonia’s WJP score was 0.54 adherence to rule of law.156 This is a 
slight increase in rule of law adherence since 2014. Both fundamental rights and 
open government improved over this period of time, while order and security 
remained largely the same.  
 According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World index, Macedonia 
made great improvements in rule of law in the decade leading up to 2014. However, 
problems remained, such as the weak independence of the Constitutional Court and a 
lack of transparency in the judicial process.157 Corruption has increased in the last 
three years in Macedonia, revealing a consistent deterioration in the rule of law. For 
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example, pardons for many criminals associated with the VMRO-DPMNE – the 
party in power – resulted in widespread protests in Macedonia and doubts about 
government claims against defendants and the fairness of trials arose in the wake of 
proceedings against suspected militants in a 2015 event.158 
 Because of Macedonia’s deterioration of rule of law in the last three years, 
Macedonia is categorized as having a notable decrease in the strength of rule of law. 
Democracy in Macedonia 
 The refugee crisis “has had, at least in the short term, a mostly negative 
impact on Macedonia’s democratic development and European integration.”159 This 
section substantiates this claim with evidence about Macedonia’s levels of 
democracy and the deterioration of democracy in the last five years. In 2012, 
Macedonia was given a democracy score of 3.89 by to Freedom House’s Nations in 
Transit index. This was a marked deterioration in democracy from previous years, 
due to a decrease in national democratic government and deterioration in 
independent media. Between 2013 and 2016, Macedonia saw large-scale 
deterioration in democratic freedoms, resulting in its being demoted from a semi-
consolidated democracy to what Nations in Transit calls a “transitional government 
or hybrid regime” with a score of 4.43.160 To understand Macedonia’s democratic 
recession in the last several years, politically motivated events are highlighted below. 
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 In 2015, Macedonia fell under a major government scandal, when it was 
revealed that the Macedonian government under Nikola Gruevski illegally recorded 
670,000 conversations, exposing the “creaky democratic structure in Macedonia.”161 
This blatant abuse of power to control top officials under Gruevski’s administration 
reveals systematic corruption in Macedonia that infiltrated at least 20,000 people’s 
private lives.162 This event led to widespread protests against the Gruevski 
government in May of 2015. Protestors sought the resignation of Nikola Gruevski in 
exchange for a new transition government. A bloody attack in the Macedonian 
parliament, led by the old nationalist government left many injured and convinced 
President Gjorge Ivanov to finally appoint Zoran Zaev as the new prime minister 
after two years of political conflict. A new transition government under Zaev and the 
social democrats came into fruition when he was allowed to piece together a 
government in 2017.163 
 This years long back-and-forth between the old nationalist government and 
the opposition coalition under the social democrats left Macedonia in a vulnerable 
position, with elections being postponed twice and uncertainty about potential 
concessions for the Albanian minority in Macedonia.164 Presidential pardons granted 
by President Ivanov resulted in active civil society groups continuing to protest 
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pervasive corruption and a stagnant independent media, leading to politically biased 
news outlet in an extremely tense political climate.165 According to Freedom House, 
Macedonia’s path to democracy looks promising under Zaev’s new government. The 
future of Macedonia will depend on this government’s ability to “implement 
systemic reforms for pressing problems.”166 
 Macedonia has seen a notable decrease in levels of democracy, revealing 
widespread institutional deficiencies in the Macedonian government. This decrease 
in levels of democracy is not a cause of the refugee crisis, rather it is a cause of the 
protracted political crisis that began in 2015 and lasted until the replacement of the 
Gruevski government in June of 2017. 
Conclusion 
 
 To conclude this chapter, I find that Croatia has experienced the least 
political instability, followed by Serbia, and then Macedonia. 
Table 1: Political Stability  
Political 
Stability 
Croatia Serbia Macedonia 
Rapid change in 
policy 
Very low  Low  Medium 
Strength of rule 
of law 
Little to no 
change  
Little to no 
change  
Notable decrease 
Levels of 
democracy 
Little to no 
change  
Notable decrease Notable decrease 
 
I speculate that this stems from a variety of factors, which include: EU membership 
status, election practices and results, and a turnover in government. Although Croatia 
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has experienced some democratic backsliding and is still assessing the role played by 
corruption in the judiciary and in the elite, it has nonetheless maintained political 
stability overall because of its relationship to the EU and the ability for the EU to 
directly influence politics in the country. Similarly, Serbia’s progression in the 
membership process for the EU means that Serbia is striving to meet EU 
requirements for accession and is, therefore, implementing policies that are in line 
with the EU acquis communautaire. I speculate that Macedonia is not likely to 
achieve membership status in the near future because it is further behind in the 
accession process and is, therefore, not as proactive about implementing policies in 
line with the EU acquis communautaire. Additionally, 2016 was an election year in 
both Serbia and Croatia. Under international observation, election years are prone to 
higher democracy scores. Perhaps in non-election years to come, Croatia and Serbia 
will have more consistent scores and not show signs of political instability. 
Macedonia also experienced political turmoil distinct from the refugee crisis. 
Macedonia’s political stability was first and foremost affected by the political crisis 
that lasted two years before the new government under Zaev came to power in 2017. 
For these reasons, it is difficult to identify what political stability, if any might have 
been caused by or correlate to the refugee crisis on a large scale. Based on this data, 
there is no direct evidence to suggest that the refugee crisis has been the major cause 
of political instability in the Western Balkans but has potentially exacerbated already 
existing factors of political instability. 
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Chapter 3: 
Economic Stability in the Western Balkans 
 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, political factors are critical to 
understanding asylum policy and resulting levels of stability in transit countries. 
Economic factors also play a vital role, as states aim to provide appropriate goods 
and services to asylum seekers within their borders. According to a report in The 
Independent, refugee influxes are likely to have a positive effect on EU transit 
country economies due to the stimulus effects of increased state spending, an 
increase in GDP, lower budget deficits, and additional employment opportunities as 
skilled refugees enter the labor force.167 However, short-term effects are more likely 
to be seen in vulnerable states. Economic instability can be caused by myriad factors 
and these factors can have different effects on countries with different initial 
economic levels, including government debt and deficits, income levels, economic 
growth, and the inward and outward flow of funding to transit countries to assist in 
accommodating large numbers of asylum seekers. These indicators are discussed 
below corresponding to the timeline of the refugee crisis in the Western Balkans.  
Economic Stability in Croatia 
 
Government Deficits and Public Debt 
 
Croatia’s economy has been a major political topic in the last few years in 
preparation for in the wake of the 2016 elections. The excessive deficit procedure 
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(EDP) is a corrective arm of the EU that seeks to “bring back member states’ budget 
deficits – the difference between government spending and government revenue – to 
below 3% of GDP and public debts to below 60% of GDP, in line with the 
Maastricht criteria.”168 Croatia entered the EU’s EDP in January of 2014, when the 
country was pressured to cut its deficit to 2.7% in two years.169 This process began 
just one year after Croatia joined the EU. Croatia succeeded by decreasing its deficit 
to 0.8% of GDP from 3.4% of GDP in 2015, a greater change than that required by 
the EU’s EDP.170 Croatia’s public debt as measured in January 2017 was 83.8% of 
gross domestic product, which is a relatively high number in comparison to public 
debt in both Serbia and Macedonia but a lower number in public debt per capita.171 
This comes after the European Commission recommended Croatia be taken off the 
EDP due to positive results in the previous two years.  
The fiscal impact of refugees “crucially depends on the characteristics of 
those arriving, of the capacity of transit countries to manage the flows and the 
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capacity of destination countries to integrate those asylum seekers that are 
recognized as refugees.”172 In the case of the Western Balkans, including in Croatia, 
an influx of an unprecedented number of asylum seekers does not necessarily result 
in any number of these asylum seekers being granted refugee status by the state. In 
most cases, asylum seekers do not remain in Croatia and those that do, often do so 
because destination countries elsewhere are hesitant to accept them. This is a 
defining characteristic of transit countries in the region and affects the governmental 
expenditure on both asylum seekers registration and processing and integration.  
Croatia is the only case in this thesis that has been granted EU member status, 
which makes it unique as a transit country in the Western Balkans. Because the 
refugee crisis is a humanitarian crisis that affects many countries in the EU, as well 
as neighboring countries, the EU itself has committed to providing financial 
assistance to states totaling around 500 million euros.173 This means that each 
resettled person would bring in a 10,000 euro grant, including to resettled persons 
within Croatian borders.174 Although other stakeholders in the Croatian refugee crisis 
include non-governmental and international organizations, the most effective 
responders at the beginning of the crisis were “ordinary citizens and individual 
volunteers from all over Europe.”175 Because of these non-governmental 
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stakeholders, the entire burden of provisions for asylum seekers in Croatia did not 
fall on the Croatian government. However, there were several big expenditures 
related to asylum seekers, for which the Croatian government took responsibility. In 
addition to the establishment of three refugee camps, Opatovac, Tovarnik, and 
another larger camp in Slavonski Brod, Croatia agreed to pay 5.9 million euros to 
keep asylum seekers in Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Deal.176 Funds were also 
provided for the transportation of large numbers of asylum seekers between refugee 
centers in Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia.177  
Croatia as it stands alone is ultimately more financially stable than Serbia and 
Macedonia because of the help of the EU and its participation in various EU 
resettlement programs that aim to split the burden between EU member states. 
However, early in the refugee crisis, Croatia was scolded by the European 
Commission because it was one of twelve EU member states that had not yet paid 
any amount into the EU’s refugee fund.178 The lack of participation by a significant 
number of EU states in the common EU process has strained the EU and led to 
tensions between EU member states. Croatia’s total incoming funding in 2015 was 
US $203,163, most of which came from the United Nations Children’s Fund and the 
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government of Croatia. Subsequently in 2016, Croatia received US $1,075,614, most 
of which was used for Croatia’s Migration Response Plan and other humanitarian 
assistance.179 This expansion of external funding to Croatia represents an increase in 
funding in response to the exacerbation of the refugee crisis in the Western Balkans.  
Croatia has seen significant improvement in its deficit levels, but has also 
seen higher levels of government debt. This does not indicate that Croatia is 
economically unstable. High levels of government debt are accumulated over time 
and may, in the future, reveal effects from transit migration. These numbers are 
indicative of the temporal nature of both: public deficit sees greater short-term 
change than government debt. The suggestion that Croatia be taken off the EDP also 
indicates that experts believe that Croatia’s economy is continuing to grow and 
deficits are decreasing. These changes came about from increases in Croatia’s 
tourism industry, accelerated private consumption, and a rebound of investment.180  
Croatia is classified as having a notable increase in public debt and a notable 
decrease in government deficits.  
Income and Economic Growth 
 
 Prior to acceding to the EU in 2013, Croatia experienced a six-year protracted 
recession that left its economy stunted at crisis levels.181 Croatia’s economy returned 
to growth in 2015 amid the peak of the influx of asylum seekers into the country. In 
2016, Croatia’s economy grew by 3%, due to high levels of tourism, increased 
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industrial production, and construction, an unexpected development despite some of 
the burdens of the refugee crisis in the Western Balkans and a new election cycle.182 
This is the highest growth that the country has seen since the beginning of the 
refugee crisis. These levels of growth are intimately connected with Croatia’s 
relationship to the EU, as accession has not only resulted in more robust political and 
economic stability, but also access to the EU’s internal market.183   
 In the years of the refugee crisis, Croatia experienced a notable increase in 
income and economic growth, improving the state’s economy amid concerns about 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers in Croatia. This reveals that economies can 
improve, even in countries experiencing a humanitarian crisis. This, however, does 
not indicate the norm for all states. 
Additional Economic Attributes 
 
In addition to Croatia’s economic factors listed above, the European 
Commission recognized “macroeconomic imbalances” of some concern that the 
commission aims to analyze in the foreseeable future through a National Reform 
Programme whose work is only possible through a stable political system.184 These 
include high levels of youth unemployment and population shrinkage, and outdated 
public services, the judiciary, and state-owned enterprises. Because of the political 
conditions prior to the 2016 elections in Croatia, the National Reform Programme 
could not implement economic reforms necessary to stabilize Croatia’s finances. The 
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new government that took power in 2016 opened the door for both political and 
economic reforms through this program. As mentioned above, it is critical for 
Croatia to first establish political stability in order to implement some of the 
economic reforms that will prolong the growth trend that we have seen the last two 
years. Croatia’s labor force participation could be increased if asylum seekers are 
granted refugee status and integrated into the work force.  
Because economic conditions are largely affected by codification and 
implementation of legislation, advances in technology, and increased physical and 
social capital to name a few, it is vital to all the national economies discussed in this 
section that the country has evolved and established robust and effective institutions 
to implement economic policy. Croatia has seen a relatively successful transition to 
democracy after the fall of Yugoslavia and boasts higher levels of democratic 
freedoms than the other two countries in this study. Therefore, it is logical to 
conclude that Croatia’s levels of economic stability in the midst of the refugee crisis 
are greater than in the two countries with lower levels of political stability and less-
developed economies. 
Economic Stability in Serbia 
 
Government Deficits and Public Debt 
 
 In 2014, the Serbian government introduced a fiscal consolidation program, 
which has decreased public deficits, increased revenues, and introduced wage and 
pension reforms.185 These measures were undertaken in response to structural 
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reforms aimed at contributing to Serbia’s EU accession process. In 2016, Serbia’s 
deficit was only 1.4% of GDP, a major decrease from 6.6% of GDP only two years 
prior.186 Then, in 2016, the World Bank Group established a Country Partnership 
Framework to be implemented between 2016-2020, which includes: restoring fiscal 
and macroeconomic stability, creating conditions for accelerated private sector 
growth and job creation, improving infrastructure, and strengthening public sector 
management and service delivery to citizens.187  
Serbia’s national debt consistently increased from 2008 until 2015, at its 
height reaching 74.7% of the country’s GDP in 2015.188 Relative to national debt in 
many major powers countries, this number is quite small. In 2016, the national debt 
decreased slightly to 72.9% of GDP, perhaps indicating the beginning of a trend of 
decreasing Serbia’s national debt.189 A major contributor to Serbia’s national debt is 
the debt incurred by Kosovo and assumed by Serbia because of its refusal to 
recognize Kosovo’s independence proclaimed in 2008.190 After a brief hiatus during 
the Balkan Wars, Serbia resumed paying Kosovo’s foreign debt in 2001, which is a 
heavy burden for a state to assume, especially as Kosovo’s foreign debt continues to 
grow as well.191  
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As of June 2017, the EU has given Serbia $55 million to help with refugee 
processing and integration programs.192 Additional funding has been provided by 
external governments and aid organizations. The government of Germany has 
contributed significantly to Serbia’s refugee fund, as well as the European 
Commission and the United Nations.193 Supplies also continuously flow into Serbia 
such as blankets, sleeping bags, mattresses, beds, and heaters, especially peaking in 
early 2017 when many asylum seekers were stranded in freezing temperatures on the 
Serbian border.194 In 2016, funding flowing into Serbia exceeded US $28 million, a 
massive gap compared to the funding received by Croatia in the same year.195 I 
speculate that Serbia received more financial assistance during the refugee crisis than 
Croatia because of its lack of EU membership status. This status has provided 
Croatia with external funding for asylum seekers and a stable platform for financial 
processes to accommodate refugees, whereas Serbia has not received the same 
benefits. 
Serbia’s national debt has increased since 2008 and then stabilized in 2015 
and 2016. Overall, Serbia’s debt saw a notable increase, while Serbia’s government 
deficits saw a notable decrease. Like the state of Croatia, Serbia’s increase in debt is 
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not attributable to the refugee crisis, as much of Serbia’s debt increase stemmed from 
the assumption of Kosovo’s debt. Serbia’s national debt related to Kosovo’s debt 
increased because Kosovo’s national debt also increased in the years of interest. 
Income and Economic Growth 
 
In the big picture, Serbia’s economy has continued to improve since the end 
of the global economic recession and the beginning of the refugee crisis. Through the 
various measures undertaken by the Serbian government in partnership with the 
World Bank, Serbia’s economy grew 2.8% in 2016, but stagnated in early 2017 
because of a “decline in agricultural output.”196 The outlook for Serbia’s economy 
for the next few years includes annual growth, a decline in unemployment, and a 
decline in poverty due to rising investment, the result of more favorable and less 
risky conditions for investors.197 Much of this success has to do with implementation 
of recommendations and projects developed by exogenous actors, including the 
World Bank Group and the EU. According to the World Bank Group, medium-term 
– the next 2-3 years – outlooks predict 3-4% growth rates in GDP.198 As the result of 
a major drought in Serbia, agricultural output will continue to decrease in the short-
term, but important governmental measures, such as an energy bill discount program 
and efforts to stimulate the private sector by improving the investment climate will 
aid in Serbia’s annual growth, reduction in poverty, and overall economic 
improvement in the next several years.199  
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Based on these statistics, Serbia has seen notable economic growth that is not 
attributable to the refugee crisis. 
Additional Economic Attributes 
 
In addition to the characteristics listed above, Serbia’s more positive response 
to a major influx of asylum seekers has been encouraging to non-governmental 
actors who wish to somehow provide funding and other assistance to help asylum 
seekers in vulnerable conditions. While Croatia’s economy is ultimately more stable 
than that of Serbia, due in part to Croatia’s EU membership status, Serbia received 
much more foreign assistance to be used to accommodate increasing numbers of 
asylum seekers, making it possible for the Serbian government to maintain pre-crisis 
levels of economic stability. 
Economic Stability in Macedonia 
 
Government Deficits and Public Debt 
 
 Macedonia’s public debt has steadily increased from 24.07% of GDP in 2010 
to 47.7% of GDP in 2016 and has thereafter remained relatively stable.200 Although 
these numbers seem small compared with the public debt of both Serbia and Croatia, 
Macedonia has the highest debt per capita of all three countries.201 The least 
politically stable of the three case countries, Macedonia has not had effective 
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institutions to implement beneficial economic policy. The new government that took 
power in 2017 has created a more positive climate for investment and could 
potentially signal an upward slope in Macedonia’s economic situation, however it is 
too early in the new government’s term to tell what the long-term impacts of the 
Zaev administration will be. 
According to the World Bank snapshot of Macedonia updated in October 
2017, the fiscal deficit, as well as the national public debt are expected to rise in the 
next two years before falling again after initial shocks have abated and the political 
crisis has been entirely resolved under the new government.202 Overall, Macedonia’s 
economy has showed some resilience through the shocks of the political crisis and 
the uncertainties of the refugee crisis. Although Macedonia saw high numbers of 
asylum seekers enter its borders in the years of the refugee crisis, the country had a 
much greater issue in the infrastructure of its national government that led to 
economic instability, including in the form of exacerbated debt and government 
deficits due to a major influx of funding coming into Macedonia both to assist with 
refugees and the political crisis. This instability was certainly exacerbated by the 
refugee crisis but secondary to ineffective institutions more generally and great 
political uncertainty.  
Macedonia received major funding from external actors during the first two 
years of the refugee crisis, with a hefty amount of assistance in 2016 totaling US 
$45,313,406.203 This was a three-fold increase from the funding Macedonia received 
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in 2015. Already in 2017, Macedonia has received over US $1 million in aid.204 
Similar to aid flowing into Croatia and Serbia in these years, most of Macedonia’s 
funding was aimed at assisting the country in response to the refugee crisis. As a 
non-EU member state, Macedonia, like Serbia received greater assistance than 
Croatia. Because of Macedonia’s political and economic instability, the country’s 
capacity to respond to the refugee crisis was much lower than that of the other two 
cases in this project. For these reasons, Macedonia required much more aid in order 
to effectively and appropriately respond to the refugee crisis and also received 
funding from external actors to deal with a corruption scandal and the complete 
turnover of the Macedonian government that took place this year. 
Macedonia’s debt and deficit levels have taken a hit in the last several years, 
due to the protracted political crisis and major deficiencies in the government. 
Macedonia is classified as having a notable increase in both public debt and 
government deficits. 
Income and Economic Growth 
 
 Following Macedonia’s lengthy political crisis from 2014-2017, the warring 
political parties settled on the Przino Agreement, which includes procedures to affect 
economic growth, job creation, fair taxation, support to small and medium 
enterprises, and reform of social protection of the most vulnerable.205 This has been a 
positive move for Macedonia in getting its economy back on track after the 
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uncertainty caused by intense political instability. Economic growth in Macedonia 
took a hit in the years of the political crisis, first slowing and then turning negative in 
the first half of 2017 because of high risk to investments secondary to the uncertain 
political climate.206 However, a new, more stable government took power in June 
2017, increasing confidence in investment and leading experts to believe that the 
Macedonian economy should recover by the end of this year. 
 Although Macedonia has seen some economic shrinkage at the beginning of 
this year, its economic stagnation classifies it as seeing little to no change in the size 
of its economy and its levels of income.   
Conclusion 
 
 Economic stability is grossly intertwined with political stability, as we see 
through the data provided to measure economic stability in the three case countries. 
Because of this connection, political instability often occurs in tandem with 
economic instability and vice versa. Therefore, the countries that have experienced 
political instability through a change in government, rapid changes in refugee policy, 
and/or low levels of democracy and rule of law will be the most likely to experience 
economic instability as well.  
Table 2: Economic Stability 
Economic 
Stability 
Croatia Serbia Macedonia 
Public debt Notable increase Notable increase Notable increase 
Government 
deficits 
Notable decrease Notable decrease Notable increase 
Economic 
growth and 
income levels 
Notable growth Notable growth Economic 
stagnation 
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Croatia’s economy is the most stable because of its established and robust 
democracy. In stark contrast, Macedonia has yet to transition fully to a free 
democracy and the nature of the hybrid regime that has existed in the last few years 
in Macedonia has led to political instability and, therefore, a hostile climate for 
investors and overall economic instability. Serbia is a good example of a country that 
has maintained relative stability in both the political and economic spheres, in part 
due to the potential for EU accession and the assistance of external governments and 
other non-governmental organizations that have provided funding for the 
humanitarian crisis that is taking place within the broader refugee crisis.  
 While the refugee crisis has led to major changes in transit countries’ 
economies, it is difficult to tell whether economic instability has stemmed directly 
from refugee influx. In all cases, there are confounding factors that have caused great 
political instability and have, therefore, impacted economic characteristics. 
Additionally, the international community has shown that it will provide funding in 
dire circumstances, including in Serbia and Macedonia where the need for funding 
was exacerbated by a greater influx of asylum seekers and lower initial levels of 
economic stability in development. External aid is extremely important in both 
Serbia and Macedonia because of their high numbers of refugees per capita relative 
to Croatia. These traits are indicative of the effects that the refugee crisis has had on 
transit country economies, however are inconclusive in pointing to a correlation 
between the refugee crisis and increased economic instability.   
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Chapter 4: 
Social Stability in the Western Balkans 
 
 The Western Balkans have a long history of social tensions, primarily based 
on ethnicity and religion. Minority populations in each of the former Yugoslav 
countries typically experience discrimination or underrepresentation as populations 
adapt to relatively new conditions and some political and economic instability. An 
influx of asylum seekers from MENA countries might be a reason for growing social 
instability in the Western Balkans, as these countries are still dealing with ethnic 
tensions left over from the Balkan Wars that plagued the region. This section 
discusses social instability and use the indicators provided in the first chapter to 
determine whether there is enough evidence to believe that refugee populations lead 
to increased social instability in transit countries. 
Social Stability in Croatia 
 
As a country with a history of positive relations with the Muslim community 
and one of only four EU member states that legally recognizes Islam as an official 
religion, Croatia’s attitude toward the native Muslim and migrant communities has 
been largely friendly. In 2015, the number of Muslims in Croatia was recorded at 
66,973 or 1.5% of the country’s population.207 The number of asylum seekers 
entering Croatia peaked in 2015. Reports indicate that there was a significant change 
in attitudes toward migration into Croatia following this peak. From the beginning of 
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2015 until the end of 2015, survey results on migration revealed a rise in negative 
feelings toward migration by 10%.208 This statistic is indicative of broad feelings 
toward migrants amid the refugee crisis and the major influx of asylum seekers into 
the Western Balkans. Here I discuss what major factors play a role in increased 
negative feelings toward migrants in Croatia. 
Ethnic Violence 
 
Prior to the refugee crisis, Croatia’s primary human rights issue was reported 
as violence against minority communities, mostly against the Roma and Serb 
populations in Croatia. However, the refugee crisis has incited renewed violence, 
especially against asylum seekers trying to cross Croatia’s border. While much of the 
violence occurred in the last year when law enforcement officials clashed with large 
numbers of asylum seekers at the Croatian-Serbian border, there is a broader, more 
internalized attitude toward migrants, especially from Muslim-majority countries 
prevalent in Croatian society. A 2015 report on the country’s levels of Islamophobia 
shows that Islamophobia rose in part due to the refugee crisis and instability in the 
Middle East.209 With a rise in Islamophobia in the country, there were increased 
reports of hate crimes based on racism and xenophobia, especially perpetrated by law 
enforcement officials seeking to protect Croatian borders.  
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has 
developed a hate crime reporting database through its Office for Democratic 
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Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) that seeks to reduce the number of hate 
crimes and increase national reporting on hate crimes in participating states of the 
OSCE. This platform has produced reports on hate crimes in participating states 
since 2011 and some reports have categorized hate crimes by bias motivation. With 
the greatest number of hate crimes due to xenophobia and racism in Croatia recorded 
in 2013 at 30, hate crimes motivated by these biases have since decreased. In 2014, 
17 of the 22 reported hate crimes were motivated by racism and xenophobia, while in 
2015, 15 of the 24 reported hate crimes in Croatia were motivated by racism and 
xenophobia.210 Judged purely on this data, it might be assumed that hate crimes 
generally have decreased, as well as the proportion of crimes that are motivated by 
xenophobia and racism. Additional figures, however, suggest that the population of 
asylum seekers decreased in the same years due to closures along the Western 
Balkans migration route. For example, in 2014, 229 persons applied for asylum in 
Croatia, a significant decrease from the 721 persons who applied for asylum in the 
same period in 2013.211 A decrease in hate crimes due to racism and xenophobia 
corresponded to a decrease in asylum seekers entering the country.  
This does not indicate that ethnic violence has decreased because of a 
decrease in racism and xenophobia. There are confounding factors that might impact 
why ethnic violence in the form of hate crimes has decreased, including because of 
measures taken by the international community through the OSCE to strengthen 
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cooperation between the authorities in Croatia and the OSCE’s ODIHR to prosecute 
hate crimes more effectively. It is also true that the year 2013, in which the most hate 
crimes were recorded in Croatia in recent history marked the year that an influx of 
asylum seekers began using the Western Balkans route to attempt to enter the EU. 
Because this was a relatively new phenomenon, Croatia did not have stable 
institutions to implement policy in response to huge numbers of asylum seekers. 
With help from the EU, EC, and other international organizations, Croatia was able 
to amend and implement policy and provide “adequate” conditions for asylum 
seekers as of an Amnesty International report in 2016.212 These statistics show the 
progression of Croatia’s response to the refugee crisis. While the beginning of the 
crisis shortly after the Arab Spring in 2011 showed an increase in ethnic violence 
due to racism and xenophobia, ethnic violence continued to decrease as the refugee 
crisis progressed and the Croatian government, in tandem with neighboring 
governments and the EU controlled the influx of asylum seekers, keeping ethnic 
violence at a low level. 
Because Croatia has seen a slight fluctuation in both directions of levels of 
ethnic violence, it is unclear that the refugee crisis has had any impact on levels of 
ethnic violence in Croatia. Therefore, Croatia is classified as having seen little to no 
change. 
Ethno-Nationalist Discourse 
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Migrants became a major discussion point, as right-wing political parties 
“expressed rising Islamophobic standpoints, using the migration flow as a threat 
against local traditions, customs, and way of life.”213 Ladislav Ilcic, president of the 
right-wing Hrast party and member of the Patriotic Coalition “made several strong 
Islamophobic statements in the course of discussions over the government 
formation” in 2015.214 In response to comments made by right-wing politicians like 
Ilcic, the media became heavily involved. Ivica Sola is a conservative commentator 
who defended Ilcic’s standpoints and expressed concern over the term 
“Islamophobia” while controversially criticizing the Qur’an and Islamic law.215 
While Islamophobic discourse is not inherently ethno-nationalist, it is the case in 
Croatia that right-wing parties have in the last several years produced statements that 
elevate “typical Croatian” qualities over perceived contradictory qualities of 
Muslims. For example, Ilcic explained that Muslims have “weaker work ethics” 
which could damage the culture and reputation of Croatian workers in the country.216  
In addition to this kind of ethno-nationalist discourse related to public policy, 
the media has also played a defining role in the rise of Islamophobia in Croatia 
through the use of ethno-nationalist rhetoric. Problems with media coverage of Islam 
in particular include the “risk of different understandings, misinterpretations and 
misuses,” which can “provoke a deeper divide between cultures and civilizations.”217 
Terms related to Islam such as “jihadists” and “Islamist militants” are often 
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improperly used in the media and promote Islamophobic ideals to the public.218 
Sensationalism both in political circles and in the media has led to increased 
Islamophobia and Croatian ethno-nationalism in public discourse without due cause. 
Based on this data, Croatia is seen as having a notable increase in ethno-
nationalist discourse. This is partially attributable to the refugee crisis, as much of 
the discourse is directed toward the Muslim population entering Croatia’s borders.  
Transnational Conflict 
 
 While many of the indicators of social instability take place within the 
country, there are some transnational conflicts that affect social stability in Croatia. 
Since the beginning of the refugee crisis, many of these conflicts are centered around 
border conflicts with neighboring states. While Croatia and Serbia warred against 
one another in the 1990s, relations between the two countries had been relatively 
peaceful until renewed conflict resulted from disagreements regarding the refugee 
crisis. A “tit-for-tat” exchange came when Croatia closed its borders to all trucks 
with Serbian registrations.219 Thereafter, Serbia “banned cargo traffic from Croatia” 
which then caused Croatia to retaliate by blocking entry to Croatia for all vehicles 
with Serbian license plates.220 Many experts and reporters have compared these 
tensions between Croatia and Serbia with the unstable relations between the two 
countries in the early 1990s. 
                                                 
218 Obucina, 106. 
219 Valerie Hopkins, “Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Balkans,” Foreign Policy, 1 
October 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/01/frying-pan-balkans-syria-
refugees-stuck-croatia-serbia-tension/.  
220 Ibid. 
 82 
 A second external conflict Croatia has been dealing with in 2017 is a border 
dispute between Croatia and Slovenia. A judgment earlier this year “handed Slovenia 
the vast majority of the Bay of Piran and set up a special corridor to give the country 
access to the high seas via Croatian waters.”221 Croatia has since refused to recognize 
this ruling, accusing Slovenia of meddling in the judgment.222 Although it is not 
expected that this conflict will lead to violence between the two countries, it has still 
provoked diplomatic tensions and strained relations between the two countries. 
 These transnational border conflicts are direct results of the refugee crisis and 
the influx of asylum seekers into the Western Balkan states. This classifies Croatia as 
having seen a notable increase in transnational conflicts that is attributable to the 
refugee crisis. 
Social Stability in Serbia 
 
 In the 21st century, Serbia continues to suffer from scars left by the Balkan 
wars in the early 1990s. However, it is clear that Serbia’s status as a candidate 
country for EU accession has increased awareness of Islamophobia and the rights of 
asylum seekers and resulted mostly in positive feedback from the international 
community. According to a report on Islamophobia published in 2015, “although 
political officials acted in accordance with democratic principles and Serbia has 
received acclaim from the international community, it is nearly impossible for a 
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tragedy of this magnitude to pass without incident.”223 Although Serbia has been 
lauded by the international community for effectively and appropriately responding 
to the refugee crisis, there are still instances of ethnic violence, hate speech against 
minority groups, and transnational conflict between Serbia and neighboring states in 
direct correlation with the refugee crisis. 
Ethnic Violence 
 
 Like Croatia, ethnic violence in Serbia has historically affected the Roma 
population and other ethnic minorities rather than religious minorities. These issues 
have not been solved, evident in a case in 2015 when a Romani organization was 
attacked by non-Roma perpetrators.224 However, ethnic violence against other groups 
continues to occur, despite the peacekeeping initiatives and development strategies 
that have been implemented in partnership with the EU. Incidents include ethnically 
charged tensions between Serbs and Hungarians in the autonomous region of 
Vojvodina, tensions between Serbs and Albanians in the autonomous region of 
Kosovo, and tensions between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs in several regions in 
Serbia.225  
While Croatian officials have practiced effective reporting to OSCE’s 
ODIHR on hate crimes, the Serbian government has placed less emphasis on 
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reporting hate crimes and, therefore, many of the statistics in the ODIHR database 
have been reported by civil society. This results in fewer statistics on ethnic violence 
and hate crimes in Serbia that are publicly available. Nonetheless, the statistics we do 
have show a much bigger number of hate crimes in Serbia than in Croatia. These are 
reported largely without identifying them by their motivational biases. In 2015, 
Serbia’s ODIHR report included evidence that a majority of hate crimes perpetrated 
were based on racist and xenophobic attitudes.226 Additionally, an Oxfam report has 
concluded that some of the most egregious actions taken against refugees have been 
in Serbia and Macedonia.227 In response to these hate crimes, the United Nations 
High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) conducted eight training sessions for 
representatives of local municipalities on the subject of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) which included addressing hate crimes in communities.228  
Serbia has seen a notable increase in ethnic violence, attributable to the 
refugee crisis, as hate crimes based on Islamophobia and xenophobia are on the rise.  
Ethno-Nationalism 
 
 While Serbia has a long history of Islamophobia and Islamophobic attacks, 
one European report claims that the potential for EU accession has positively 
impacted Serbia’s relationship to the Muslim population within its borders.229 
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Contrary to the political parties in Croatia, the largest political parties in Serbia did 
not use Islamophobia in political rhetoric during 2015, indicating a public acceptance 
of religious differences and negative responses to the same fear-mongering used in 
politics in Croatia. This is a result of Serbia’s history of ethno-nationalism and its 
suppression of ethno-nationalist sentiments to achieve EU membership. Nonetheless, 
in the European Report on Islamophobia, Serbia was cited to have 
underrepresentation of Bosnian Muslims in local administration, the judiciary, and 
the police.230  
 Amid Serbia’s financial crisis in 2014, austerity measures and high 
unemployment resulted in a resurgence of ultra-nationalist parties in the Serbian 
government. A “Greater Serbia” ideology still remains in parties such as the Serbian 
Radical Party, which has become the third biggest party in the Serbian parliament as 
of 2016.231 This view includes integrating parts of Bosnia and Croatia with Serb 
majorities into Serbia to form a bigger and “greater” Serbia. This rise in populism is 
indicative of rising levels of ethno-nationalism in response to national crisis. 
However, there is no evidence to support the idea that this ethno-nationalism is 
directly a result of the refugee crisis. 
 According to the data above, the 2016 Serbian elections have shown low 
levels of ethno-nationalist rhetoric in comparison to Croatia. Therefore, Serbia is 
classified as having seen little to no change in levels of ethno-nationalist discourse. 
Transnational Conflicts 
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 Serbia’s greatest conflicts include the “tit-for-tat” exchanges with Croatia 
explained above and an ongoing feud with Kosovo regarding the recognition of its 
status as an independent state. Kosovo, a country with an Albanian majority, 
declared independence from Serbia in 2008. However, this independence is not 
recognized by Russia and many other states, including by Serbia itself. This conflict 
has somewhat ebbed with an EU-brokered deal between Kosovo and Serbia that was 
implemented in October of 2017. Prior to the implementation of this deal, there were 
many protests by Kosovans who feared that Serbs in the country would be given 
more power through a deal with Serbia and the EU. Although this conflict is separate 
from the refugee crisis in Serbia, it nonetheless has contributed to social instability in 
Serbia.232 
 Serbia and Croatia have experienced border conflicts primarily with one 
another. Serbia has seen a notable increase in transnational conflicts, like Croatia. 
Social Stability in Macedonia 
 
 Out of the three cases, Macedonia has experienced the highest levels of social 
instability during the years of the refugee crisis. Macedonian officials have been the 
most violent toward asylum seekers, using tear gas and stun grenades to forcibly 
push refugees back across their borders.233 Macedonia also has a long history of 
ethnic tensions with the Albanian minority in the country which has often resulted in 
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violent confrontation between the two ethnic groups. For these reasons, Macedonia is 
the most vulnerable to social instability caused by an influx of asylum seekers.  
Ethnic Violence 
 
 In May 2015, a standoff between Albanians and Macedonians revealed the 
state of ethnic tensions between the two groups in Macedonia. During this standoff, 
18 people were killed when a group of Albanians opened fire in Kumanovo.234 The 
trial for the 29 Albanians accused of terrorism is still ongoing. Additional cases 
involving brutality between ethnic groups in 2003 and 2012 were resolved with hefty 
sentences given to perpetrators.235 These violent events reveal the historical 
animosity between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia. Although these 
ethnically charged crimes are widely reported in news media, Macedonia has not 
been successful in coordinating with the OSCE ODIHR Hate Crimes Reporting 
database on the same level as other participating states of the OSCE. Nonetheless, 
OSCE ODIHR recorded 32 hate crimes motivated by racism and xenophobia in 
2015. These reports originated with individuals and civil society organizations. As 
OSCE ODIHR notes, Macedonia “has not reported on hate crimes separately from 
cases of hate speech.”236 
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 The refugee crisis, although significant for Macedonia, has been 
overshadowed by the political crisis in the country. Ethnic tensions were exacerbated 
by the political crisis and the fear of renewed ethnic violence was often said to be a 
result of the political instability, rather than a result of the refugee crisis.237 However, 
the refugee crisis “demonstrated that Islamophobia in the Macedonian context is not 
linked exclusively to ethnic minorities, but also to xenophobia.”238 The case of 
Macedonia is significant insofar as the Muslim Albanian minority has become 
separate from the influx of Muslim refugees because of noticeable ethnic 
differences.239 While many Macedonians are reported to have helped with the 
response to the refugee crisis, there were also instances of attacks by individuals 
“who took advantage of a vulnerable situation.”240 A mosque in one part of 
Macedonia was also vandalized and burned. This incident is discussed further in the 
following section.  
 Despite there being less information available on ethnic violence and hate 
crimes in Macedonia, the few instances of ethnic violence reported have been 
motivated by Islamophobia. Therefore, Macedonia has experienced a notable 
increase in ethnic violence. However, this cannot be attributed to refugees because 
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Macedonia has historically had a Muslim Albanian minority, against whom ethnic 
violence has often taken place. 
Ethno-Nationalism 
 
 According to the 2016 European Islamophobia Report, “discrimination both 
towards ethnic Albanians and towards refugees is fueled by discursive events that 
contains among others Islamophobic rhetoric on the platform built by strong ethno-
nationalism, securitization, and populism.”241 Because there were no elections in 
2015, Macedonian nationalist rhetoric was somewhat ebbed. In response to the 
incident in which the mosque in Kriva Palanka was vandalized, the mayor of the 
town stated that “the mosque will not be rebuilt because the majority of the 
population is Orthodox.”242 It was revealed after the unmasking of a corrupt elite 
under Nikola Gruevski that the elite were also involved in discrimination against 
Albanians, emphasizing ethnic and religious differences between groups.243 This 
reveals the feelings of the political elite and their views for the future of Macedonia.   
 The media played a serious role in exacerbation of Islamophobia in 
Macedonia both in 2015 and 2016. While reporting on the refugee crisis, media 
outlets are known to have incited fear, xenophobia, and Islamophobia.244 In 
Georgiev’s concluding remarks in his 2015 report, he further emphasizes the notion 
that Islamophobia in Macedonia is often overlooked because of other forms of 
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discrimination that remains part of ethnic and political tensions in the country.245 
Media reports also focused largely on global issues, including terrorism and 
migration and the arrest of foreign fighters in Macedonia in 2016 increased discourse 
on foreign fighters and religious conversion in the media.246 
 There was some increase in ethno-nationalist discourse that can be attributed 
to an influx of asylum seekers. However, the political crisis in the country has taken 
priority and has stalled public elections, leaving little room for campaigning and 
utilizing Islamophobia as a political platform. Additionally, I speculate that under the 
Zaev government, ethno-nationalist rhetoric will begin to decline. 
Transnational Conflicts 
 
 Macedonia’s greatest external conflict is with its neighbor, Greece, with 
whom relations are less than friendly. The conflict was heightened when asylum 
seekers attempted to cross the border from Greece into Macedonia, leading to police 
violence and increased tensions between the two countries. However, under the new 
government, experts speculate that Greece and Macedonia will come to a settlement 
on the 27-year-long name dispute that has exacerbated conflict in the region.247 This 
move reiterates the idea that the transition to the new government under Social 
Democrat Zoran Zaev will lead to more stability in all spheres, including in the 
social sphere and transnational conflicts.  
                                                 
245 Georgiev, “Islamophobia in Macedonia,” 2015. 
246 Georgiev, “Islamophobia in Macedonia,” 2016.  
247 Helena Smith, “Macedonia and Greece appear close to settling 27-year dispute 
over name,” The Guardian, 13 June 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/13/macedonias-nato-hopes-rise-as-
deal-with-greece-looks-feasible.  
 91 
 Macedonia has experienced an additional layer of transnational conflict with 
Greece attributable to the refugee crisis, because the two countries share a border. 
However, the dispute between Macedonia is both historic and improving, and I posit 
that there has been little to no change in transnational conflict attributable to the 
refugee crisis. 
Conclusion 
 
 Out of the three indicators of stability, social stability has been the most 
affected by the refugee crisis in the three case countries.  
Table 3: Social Stability 
Social Stability Croatia Serbia Macedonia 
Ethnic violence Little to no 
change 
Notable increase Notable increase 
Ethno-
nationalist 
discourse 
Notable increase Little to no 
change 
Notable increase 
Transnational 
conflict 
Notable increase Notable increase Little to no 
change 
 
An upward trend in ethno-nationalism after the fall of Yugoslavia has reemerged in 
politics in some Western Balkan states – Croatia and Macedonia – leading to right-
wing, anti-migrant attitudes and the securitization of the refugee crisis. While hate 
crimes have not necessarily increased specifically targeting Muslims, there are 
instances in which ethnic tensions, such as tensions in Macedonia between 
Macedonians and Albanians have played a role in deteriorating social stability. 
Additionally, transnational conflicts in the region have led to a great number of 
border disputes. Insofar as the refugee crisis is a crisis of borders and border 
management, policy and implementation of policy regarding asylum seekers has, in 
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most cases, led to increased tensions between states that share borders. While social 
stability is only one indicator of overall stability, it can result in instability in other 
areas because of a climate of distrust among groups. Social stability is, therefore, 
paramount to stability in the Western Balkans and the evidence above suggests that 
the refugee crisis has affected social stability in the three case countries due to an 
extensive history of ethnic and religious tensions in the region. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
The refugee crisis has had myriad effects on the Western Balkans, however 
there are particular traits about the case countries in this project that have led them to 
have more effective capabilities in absorbing asylum seekers without suffering from 
large-scale instability. Political characteristics that correspond with lower levels of 
political instability include fewer rapid policy changes, a strong system of rule of 
law, and higher levels of democratic governance. Additionally, political crises, such 
as that in Macedonia lead to political instability that is then exacerbated by a large-
scale influx of asylum seekers. Political stability is paramount to the stability of 
transit country economies, as well as social stability, insofar as policies must be 
effectively and appropriately implemented in order for beneficial changes in various 
spheres of society to come to fruition.  
 Economic instability is exacerbated by low levels of economic development, 
however foreign funding can play a defining role in a country’s ability to 
accommodate asylum seekers. Foreign assistance allows countries to respond to the 
refugee crisis without incurring large amounts of debt that are difficult to pay off 
later. However, in order to receive assistance from foreign governments or 
international organizations, states must fulfill certain requirements, including 
protecting the rights of vulnerable populations, according to international norms and 
law. Additionally, literature on the economic effects of migration concludes that 
migration and, I speculate, refugee integration can boost host country economies by 
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increasing participation in the labor force, increasing state spending, and increasing 
levels of national output.  
 Social stability is the factor that is most volatile in the Western Balkans. 
Ethnic tensions have been exacerbated in most circumstances by an influx of asylum 
seekers and politicians and the media have securitized the refugee crisis to promote 
ethno-nationalist ideals. Ethnic violence has been perpetrated by individuals and 
groups on myriad minority groups and the most effective hindrance to these negative 
effects on social stability in these case countries is the incentive for countries to 
adhere to the EU’s acquis communautaire and the provision of resources to lead to 
better international reporting on instances of ethnic violence and hate crimes.  
 One of the major factors that has played a role in all three indicators of 
stability is the potential for or already achieved EU membership status. While 
Croatia is an EU member, the EU has not held Croatia accountable. It is evident that 
the potential for EU membership has a bigger impact on the behavior of states than 
EU membership itself. In the case of Serbia, the country’s status as a candidate 
country in the close stages of EU accession has resulted in behaviors that mirror the 
behaviors that member states should be held accountable to. 
Policy Recommendations 
 
For the reasons identified above, it is imperative to stability that transit 
countries continue to push toward robust democratic governance with a strong 
system of rule of law and little or no corruption. Particularly in the case of 
Macedonia, the new government must continue to fight corruption and to focus on 
initiatives that strengthen the rule of law in the country and increase political rights 
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and civil liberties to strengthen democracy. Ideally, this will prevent democratic 
back-sliding, which remains a threat in hybrid nations in transit. Croatia has 
experienced some democratic backsliding and it is vital to the country’s position in 
the region and in the EU that the EU continue to put pressure on the government of 
Croatia to maintain democratic principles, despite Croatia’s already firm 
membership status in the EU.  
Economic benefits from exogenous actors are dependent on countries 
upholding international norms regarding refugees. Therefore, the case countries 
should expand training for officials that includes human rights protections and 
awareness of inappropriate practices. These initiatives will increase international 
support, both politically and financially, for transit countries in the region. Serbia and 
Macedonia would likely benefit from these programs, as these countries require the 
most external aid and have a more negative human rights reputation than Croatia in 
the last decade.  
The OSCE ODIHR’s hate crimes reporting database provides a platform, 
through which authorities can report on incidents within their borders. It is clear that 
these practices increase awareness of hate crimes and effective reporting increases 
accurate evaluation and proper implementation of programs aimed at preventing hate 
crimes. Serbia and Macedonia should continue to strive for EU accession by 
allocating resources to effectively report on these issues and to enforce rule of law in 
cases where hate crimes have been perpetrated. All three case countries should 
evaluate the rise of populism and the usage of fear-mongering in public media. 
Governmental and non-governmental organizations should provide workshops to 
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teach journalists about fact-checking and media coverage of the refugee crisis. 
Additional media outlets should be established that are independent from the 
government and promote evidence-based ideas regarding the refugee crisis and the 
effects of migration on the case countries.  
Recommendations for Additional Research 
 
 This project is limited in scope due to limited resources, including primary 
source material that would stem from fieldwork in the case countries. Additionally, 
this project is not a formal case study because the variables are not isolated and 
examined against a control case. Nonetheless, the extensive research done to 
complete this project certainly has broader implications for refugee and migration 
policy. In a world where mobility is increasing for a variety of reasons, countries will 
benefit from critically evaluating their refugee and migration policies and examining 
cases, where large-scale migration, including irregular migration, has been 
successful and has not heavily impacted stability. 
 To take this project to the next level, research might be done in-country to 
individually measure attitudes toward asylum seekers. A researcher might look at 
cases where democracies are robust and well-established to identify necessary 
conditions for effective integration of refugees. Similarly, a researcher might look at 
non-democratic countries and evaluate the extent to which integration into these 
countries is successful or unsuccessful. Additional research on the Western Balkans 
might include Western Balkan states that were not part of the former Yugoslavia, 
such as Hungary. To what extent does Yugoslav history have an impact on migration 
and refugee policy in the Western Balkans? The ethnic and religious makeup of these 
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case countries plays an important role in social stability. How do more homogenous 
countries respond to influxes of refugees? Is social stability more greatly affected 
when the host country is more homogenous? The case countries in this project are in 
various post-conflict stages. Are countries that are not in post-conflict stages more 
likely to appropriately and effectively respond to an influx of refugees than post-
conflict countries? 
 This project opens significant doors for additional research on the subject of 
stability and the refugee crisis. Because this is an ongoing crisis and has broader 
implications for the rest of the world, it is vital that officials understand the 
intricacies of refugee policy and best practices in registering asylum seekers and 
navigating them through the asylum process to become refugees or to be properly 
treated on their journey to destination countries. Factors identified to negatively 
impact stability in countries where there has been an influx of asylum seekers should 
be avoided in order to maintain stability. 
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